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Abstract
We develop a property-rights model of the firm in which production entails a continuum
of uniquely sequenced stages. In each stage, a final-good producer contracts with a distinct
supplier for the procurement of a customized stage-specific component. Our model yields a sharp
characterization for the optimal allocation of ownership rights along the value chain. We show
that the incentive to integrate suppliers varies systematically with the relative position (upstream
versus downstream) at which the supplier enters the production line. Furthermore, the nature of
the relationship between integration and “downstreamness” depends crucially on the elasticity
of demand faced by the final-good producer. Our model readily accommodates various sources
of asymmetry across final-good producers and across suppliers within a production line, and we
show how it can be taken to the data with international trade statistics. Combining data from
the U.S. Census Bureau’s Related Party Trade database and estimates of U.S. import demand
elasticities from Broda and Weinstein (2006), we find empirical evidence broadly supportive of
our key predictions. In the process, we develop two novel measures of the average position of
an industry in the value chain, which we construct using U.S. Input-Output Tables.
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1 Introduction
Most production processes are sequential in nature. At a broad level, the process of manufacturing
cannot commence until the eﬀorts of R&D centers in the development or improvement of products
have proven to be successful, while the sales and distribution of manufactured goods cannot be car-
ried out until their production has taken place. Even within manufacturing processes, there is often
a natural sequencing of stages. First, raw materials are converted into basic components, which
are next combined with other components to produce more complicated inputs, before themselves
being assembled into final goods. This process very much resembles Henry Ford’s original Model
T production assembly line, but recent revolutionary advances in information and communication
technology, coupled with a gradual reduction in natural and man-made trade barriers, now allow
such value chains to be ‘sliced up’ into geographically separated steps.
The implications of such sequential production for the workings of open-economy general equi-
librium models have been widely explored in the literature. Several papers, most notably Findlay
(1978), Dixit and Grossman (1982), Sanyal (1983), Kremer (1993), Kohler (2004), and Costinot,
Vogel and Wang (2011), have emphasized that the pattern of specialization along the value chain
has implications for the world income distribution and for how shocks spread across countries.
Others, including Yi (2003), Harms, Lorz, and Urban (2009), and Baldwin and Venables (2010)
have unveiled interesting nonlinearities in the response of trade flows to changes in trade frictions
in models of production where value is added sequentially along locations around the globe.
The focus of our paper is diﬀerent. Our aim is to understand how the sequentiality of production
shapes the contractual relationships between final-good producers and their various suppliers, and
how the allocation of control rights along the value chain can be designed in a way that elicits
(constrained) optimal eﬀort on the part of suppliers. An obvious premise of our work is that,
although absent from most general equilibrium models, contractual frictions are relevant for the
eﬃciency with which production is carried out, and also for the way in which production processes
are organized across borders. We find this to be a natural premise particularly in international trade
environments, in which determining which country’s laws are applicable to particular contractual
disputes is often diﬃcult. The detrimental eﬀects of imperfect contract enforcement on international
trade flows are particularly acute in transactions involving intermediate inputs, as these tend to be
associated with longer time lags between the time an order is placed (and the contract is signed)
and the time the goods or services are delivered (and the contract is executed). Such transactions
moreover often entail significant relationship-specific investments and other sources of lock-in on
the part of both buyers and suppliers.1 The relevance of contracting frictions for the organization
of production also now rests on solid empirical underpinnings.2
1Suppliers often customize their output to the needs of particular buyers and would find it hard to sell those goods
to alternative buyers, should the intended buyer decide not to abide by the terms of the contract. Similarly, buyers
often undertake significant investments whose return can be severely diminished by incompatibilities, production line
delays or quality debasements associated with suppliers not going through with their contractual obligations.
2A recent literature (see, for instance, Nunn, 2007, and Levchenko, 2007) has convincingly documented that
contracting institutions are an important determinant of international specialization. Another branch of the trade
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In this paper, we develop a property-rights model of firm boundaries that permits an analysis of
the optimal allocation of ownership rights in a setting where production is sequential in nature and
contracts are incomplete. Our model builds on Acemoglu, Antra`s and Helpman (2007). Production
of final-goods entails a large number (formally, a continuum) of production stages. Each stage is
performed by a diﬀerent supplier, who needs to undertake a relationship-specific investment in order
to produce components that will be compatible with those produced by other suppliers in the value
chain. These components are combined according to a constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES)
aggregator by a final-good producer that faces an isoelastic demand curve. Contracts between
final-good producers and their suppliers are incomplete in the sense that contracts contingent on
whether components are compatible or not cannot be enforced by third parties.
The key innovation relative to Acemoglu, Antra`s and Helpman (2007) — and relative to the
previous property-rights models of multinational firm boundaries in Antra`s (2003, 2005) and Antra`s
and Helpman (2006, 2008) — is that we introduce a natural (or technological) ordering of production
stages, so that production at a stage cannot commence until the inputs or components from all
upstream stages have been delivered. Absent a binding initial (ex-ante) agreement, the firm and
its suppliers are left to sequentially bargain over how the surplus associated with a particular stage
is to be divided between the firm and the particular stage supplier. As in Grossman and Hart
(1986), in this incomplete-contracting environment, owning a supplier is a source of power for the
firm because the residual rights of control associated with ownership allow the firm to take actions
(or make threats) that enhance their bargaining power vis-a`-vis the supplier. However, the optimal
allocation of ownership rights does not always entail all production stages being integrated, because
by reducing the bargaining power of suppliers, integration reduces the incentives of suppliers to
invest in the relationship.3
We begin in Section 2 by developing a benchmark model of firm behavior that isolates the role of
the degree of “downstreamness” of a supplier in shaping organizational decisions. A key feature of
our analysis is that the relationship-specific investments made by suppliers in upstream stages aﬀect
the incentives to invest of suppliers in downstream stages. The nature of this dependence is shaped
in turn by whether suppliers’ investments are sequential complements or sequential substitutes,
according to whether higher investment levels by prior suppliers increase or decrease the value
of the marginal product of a particular supplier. Even though, from a strict technological point
of view (i.e., in light of the CES aggregator of inputs), inputs are always complements, suppliers’
investments can still prove to be sequential substitutes when the price elasticity of demand faced by
the final-good producer is suﬃciently low, since in such cases, the value of the marginal product of
supplier investments falls particularly quickly along the value chain. Whether inputs are sequential
literature, to which our paper will contribute, has also shown that the ownership decisions of multinational firms
exhibit various patterns that are consistent with Grossman and Hart’s (1986) incomplete-contracting, property-rights
theory of firm boundaries (see, among others, Antra`s, 2003, Nunn and Trefler, 2008, 2011, and Bernard et al., 2010).
3Zhang and Zhang (2008, 2011) introduce sequential elements in a standard Grossman and Hart (1986) model
but focus on one-supplier environments in which either the firm or the supplier has a first-mover advantage. Other
papers that have studied optimal incentive provision in sequential production processes include Winter (2006) and
Kim and Shin (2011).
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complements or sequential substitutes turns out to be determined only by whether the elasticity of
final-good demand is (respectively) higher or lower than the “technological” elasticity of substitution
among inputs.
The central result of our model is that the optimal pattern of ownership along the value chain
depends critically on whether production stages are sequential complements or substitutes. When
the demand faced by the final-good producer is suﬃciently elastic, then there exists a unique
cutoﬀ production stage such that all stages prior to this cutoﬀ are outsourced, while all stages (if
any) after that threshold are integrated. Intuitively, when inputs are sequential complements, the
firm chooses to forgo control rights over upstream suppliers in order to incentivize their investment
eﬀort, since this generates positive spillovers on the investment decisions to be made by downstream
suppliers. When demand is instead suﬃciently inelastic, the converse prediction holds: it is optimal
to integrate relatively upstream stages, and if outsourcing is observed along the value chain, it
necessarily occurs relatively downstream. In Section 3, we show that these results are robust to
introducing many flexible features which have been built into the recent models of global sourcing
cited earlier. These include (headquarter) investments by the final-good producer, productivity
heterogeneity across final-good producers, and productivity and cost diﬀerences across suppliers
within a production chain. These extensions prove useful in guiding our empirical analysis.
In Sections 4 and 5, we develop an empirical test of the main predictions of our framework.
We follow the bulk of the recent empirical literature on multinational firm boundaries in using
U.S. Census data on intrafirm trade to measure the relative prevalence of vertical integration in
particular industries.4 More specifically, we correlate the share of U.S. intrafirm imports over total
U.S. imports reported during the period 2000-10 with the average degree of “downstreamness” of
that industry, and we study whether this dependence is shaped by the elasticity of demand faced
by the average buyer of output from that industry.
We propose two measures of downstreamness, both of which are constructed from the 2002 U.S.
Input-Output Tables. Our first measure is the ratio of the aggregate direct use to the aggregate total
use ( ) of a particular industry ’s goods, where the direct use for a pair of industries
( ) is the value of goods from industry  directly used by firms in industry  to produce goods
for final use.5 A high value of   thus suggests that most of the contribution of input 
tends to occur at relatively downstream production stages that are close (one stage removed) from
final demand. Our second measure of downstreamness () is a weighted index of the
average position in the value chain at which an industry’s output is used (i.e., as final consumption,
as direct input to other industries, as direct input to industries serving as direct inputs to other
industries, and so on), with the weights being given by the ratio of the use of that industry’s output
in that position relative to the total output of that industry. Although constructing such a measure
4See, for example, Nunn and Trefler (2008, 2011), Bernard et al. (2010), and D´ıez (2010). Antra`s (2011) contains a
comprehensive survey of empirical papers using other datasets, including several firm-level studies, that have similarly
used the intrafirm import share to capture the propensity towards integration relative to outsourcing.
5The total use for ( ) on the other hand is the value of goods from industry  used either directly or indirectly
in producing industry ’s output for final use, and thus incorporates the value of goods from industry  that had
entered the production chain further upstream via purchases from other industries that also provide inputs to .
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would appear to require computing an infinite power series, we show that  can be
succinctly expressed as a simple function of the square of the Leontief inverse matrix. As discussed
in Antra`s et al. (2012), there is a close connection between our measure of downstreamness and
the measure of distance to final demand derived independently by Fally (2012).
Our empirical tests also call on us to attempt to distinguish between the cases of sequential
complements and substitutes identified in the theory. For that purpose, we use the U.S. import
demand elasticities estimated by Broda andWeinstein (2006) and data on U.S. Input-Output Tables
to compute a weighted average of the demand elasticity faced by the buyers of goods from each
particular industry .
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Figure 1: Downstreamness and the Share of Intrafirm Trade
Figure 1 provides a preliminary illustration of our key empirical findings, which lend broad sup-
port for the theoretical implications of our model. As is apparent from the dark bins, for the subset
of industries with above-median average buyer demand elasticities (labeled as “Complements”), the
average U.S. intrafirm import share (for the year 2005) rises as we move from the lowest tercile of
 to the highest. In the light bins, this pattern is exactly reversed when considering
those industries facing below-median average buyer demand elasticities (labeled as “Substitutes”),
with the intrafirm trade share steadily falling across terciles of  instead.6
6As further corroboration, it is not hard to find examples of large industries (in terms of U.S. import volumes)
that exhibit similar degrees of downstreamness, but face very diﬀerent average buyer demand elasticities and also
very diﬀerent integration propensities. For instance, Women’s apparel (IO 315230) and Automobiles (IO 336111)
are among the ten most downstream manufacturing industries, but buyers tend to be much more price-sensitive in
their demand for the latter (elasticity=19.02) than for the former (elasticity=4.90). These two industries are thus
classified under the sequential substitutes and complements cases respectively, and consistent with our model, the
share of intrafirm trade is low in Women’s apparel (0.108) and very high in Automobiles (0.946). Naturally, these two
industries vary in many other dimensions that might also aﬀect their propensity to be traded inside firm boundaries.
In our econometric analysis, we will thus control for several further industry characteristics.
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Our regression analysis will confirm that the above patterns hold under more formal testing.
In particular, we uncover a positive and statistically significant relationship between each of the
measures of downstreamness and the intrafirm import share in a given sector, with this relation-
ship emerging only for high values of the demand elasticity faced by buyer industries (i.e., in the
complements case). These findings hold when controlling for other determinants of the intrafirm
trade share raised in the literature, and which our theoretical extensions also indicate are impor-
tant to explicitly consider. They are moreover robust in specifications that further exploit the
cross-country dimension of the intrafirm trade data, while controlling for unobserved variation in
factor costs with country-year fixed eﬀects. For a wide range of specifications, we will also report a
significant negative relationship between downstreamness and the intrafirm import share for goods
with low average buyer demand elasticities (i.e., in the substitutes case), as predicted by our model.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we develop our benchmark
model of sequential production with incomplete contracting and study the optimal ownership struc-
ture along the value chain. In Section 3, we develop a few extensions of the model and discuss
how we attempt to take it to the data. We describe our data sources and empirical specification in
Section 4, and present the results in Section 5. Section 6 oﬀers some concluding remarks.
2 A Model of Sequential Production with Incomplete Contracts
We begin by developing a benchmark model of firm behavior along the lines of Acemoglu et al.
(2007), but extended to incorporate a deterministic sequencing of production stages. The model is
stylized in order to emphasize the new insights that emerge from considering the sequentiality of
production. We will later incorporate more realistic features and embed the framework in industry
equilibrium to guide the empirical analysis.
2.1 Benchmark Model
Sequential Production. We consider the organizational problem of a firm producing a final
good. Production requires the completion of a measure one of production stages. We index these
stages by  ∈ [0 1], with a larger  corresponding to stages further downstream (closer to the final
end product), and we let () be the services of compatible intermediate inputs that the supplier of
stage  delivers to the firm. The quality-adjusted volume of final-good production is then given by:
 = 
µZ 1
0
()I () 
¶1
, (1)
where  is a productivity parameter,  ∈ (0 1) is a parameter that captures the (symmetric) degree
of substitutability among the stage inputs, and I () is an indicator function such that:
I () =
⎧
⎨
⎩
1 if input  is produced after all inputs 0   have been produced
0 otherwise
.
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We normalize () = 0 if an incompatible input is delivered at stage . Although production requires
completion of all stages, note that   0 ensures that output remains positive even when some
stages might be completed with incompatible inputs. In words, although all stages are essential
from an engineering point of view, we allow some substitution in how the characteristics of these
inputs shape the quality-adjusted volume of final output. For example, producing a car requires
four wheels, two headlights, one steering wheel, and so on, but the value of this car for consumers
will typically depend on the services obtained from these diﬀerent components, with a high quality
in certain parts partly making up for inferior quality in others.
Our production function in (1) resembles a conventional CES function with a continuum of
inputs, but the indicator function I () makes the production technology inherently sequential in
that downstream stages are useless unless the inputs from upstream stages have been delivered. In
fact, the technology in (1) can be expressed in diﬀerential form by applying Leibniz’ rule as:
0 () = 1
() ()1− I () ,
where () =  ¡R0 ()()¢1. Thus, the marginal increase in output brought about by the
supplier at stage is given by a simple Cobb-Douglas function of this supplier’s (compatible) input
production and the quality-adjusted volume of production generated up to that stage (which can
be viewed as an intermediate input to the stage- production process).
Input Production. There is a large number of profit-maximizing suppliers who can either en-
gage in intermediate input production or in an alternative activity that delivers an outside option
normalized to 0. We assume that each intermediate input must be produced by a diﬀerent sup-
plier with whom the firm needs to contract. Each supplier must undertake a relationship-specific
investment in order to produce a compatible input. For simplicity, we assume that the input is fully
customized to the final-good producer, so the value of this input for alternative buyers is equal to
0. To highlight the asymmetries that will arise solely from the sequencing of production, we assume
that production stages are otherwise symmetric: the marginal cost of investment is common for
all suppliers and equal to , and in all stages  ∈ [0 1], one unit of investment generates one unit
of services of the stage  compatible input when combined with the inputs from upstream suppli-
ers. (We will relax these symmetry assumptions later in Section 3.) Incompatible inputs can be
produced by all agents (including the firm) at a negligible marginal cost, but they add no value to
final-good production apart from allowing the continuation of the production process.
Preferences. The final good under study is diﬀerentiated in the eyes of consumers. The good
belongs to an industry in which firms produce a continuum of goods and consumers have preferences
that feature a constant elasticity of substitution 1 (1− ) across these varieties. More specifically,
denoting by  () the quality of a variety and by ˜ () its consumption in physical units, the
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sub-utility accruing from this industry is given by:
 =
µZ
∈Ω
( () ˜ ()) 
¶1
, with  ∈ (0 1) , (2)
where Ω denotes the set of varieties. As is well known, when maximizing (2) subject to the budget
constraint
R
∈Ω  () ˜ ()  = , where  denotes expenditure, consumer demand for a particular
variety features a constant price elasticity equal to 1 (1− ). Furthermore, the implied revenue
function of a firm that sells variety  is concave in quality-adjusted output  () ≡  () ˜ () with
a constant elasticity . Combining this feature with the production technology in (1), the revenue
obtained by the final-good producing firm under study can be written as:
 = 1−
µZ 1
0
 () I () 
¶
, (3)
where   0 is an industry-wide demand shifter that the firm treats as exogenous.
Complete Contracts. Before discussing in detail our contracting assumptions, it is instructive
to consider first the case of complete contracts in which the firm has full control over all investments
and thus over input services at all stages. In such a case, the firm makes a contract oﬀer [ ()   ()]
for every input  ∈ [0 1], under which a supplier is obliged to supply  () of compatible inputs as
stipulated in the contract in exchange for the payment  (). It is clear that the firm will have an
incentive to follow the natural sequencing of production, so that I () = 1 for all , and the optimal
contract simply solves the following maximization program:
max
{()()}∈[01]
 = 1−
µZ 1
0
 () 
¶
−
Z 1
0
 () 
  () ≥  () 
Solving this problem delivers a common investment level  = ¡1−¢1(1−) for all intermediate
inputs and associated firm profits equal to  = (1− )()(1−), while leaving suppliers with
a net payoﬀ equal to their outside option of zero (i.e.,  = ).
Incomplete Contracts. For the above contracts to be enforceable, it is important that a court of
law be able to verify the precise value of the input services provided by the suppliers of the diﬀerent
stages. In practice, however, a court of law will generally not be able to verify whether inputs are
compatible or not, and whether the services provided by compatible inputs are in accordance with
what was stipulated in a written contract. Notice also that the firm will be reluctant to sign binding
contracts that are contingent on the quantity of inputs but not on whether inputs are compatible,
because suppliers would then have every incentive to produce incompatible inputs at a negligible
cost and still demand payment. One could envision that contracts contingent on total revenues
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could provide investment incentives for suppliers, but in our setting with a continuum of suppliers,
these type of contracts have no value as they would elicit zero investment levels. For these reasons,
it is natural to study situations in which the terms of exchange between the firm and the suppliers
are not disciplined by an ex-ante enforceable contract. In fact, the initial contract is assumed to
specify only whether suppliers are vertically integrated into the firm or remain independent.
Given the lack of a binding contract, a familiar holdup problem emerges. The actual payment to
a particular supplier (say for stage) is negotiated bilaterally only after the stage input has been
produced and the firm has had a chance to inspect it. For the time being, we treat this negotiation
independently from the bilateral negotiations that take place at other stages (though we will revisit
this assumption in Section 3.1.) Because the intermediate input is assumed compatible only with
the firm’s output, the supplier’s outside option at the bargaining stage is 0. Hence, the quasi-rents
over which the firm and the supplier negotiate are given by the incremental contribution to total
revenue generated by supplier  at that stage. To compute this incremental contribution, note
that the firm has no incentive to approach suppliers in an order diﬀerent from that dictated by the
technological sequencing of production and that it can always unilaterally complete a production
stage by producing an incompatible input.7 As a result, we have I () = 1 for all   , and the
value of final-good production secured up to stage  is given by:
() = 1−
∙Z 
0
()
¸ 
. (4)
Applying Leibniz’s integral rule to this expression, we then have that the incremental contribution
of supplier  is given by:
0() =  () =


¡1−¢ ()− (). (5)
Following the property-rights theory of firm boundaries, we let the eﬀective bargaining power
of the firm vis-a`-vis a particular supplier depend on whether the firm owns this supplier or not. As
in Grossman and Hart (1986), we assume that ownership of suppliers is a source of power, in the
sense that the firm is able to extract a higher share of surplus from integrated suppliers than from
nonintegrated suppliers. Intuitively, when contracts are incomplete, the fact that an integrating
party controls the physical assets used in production will allow that party to dictate a use of these
assets that tilts the division of surplus in its favor. To keep our model as tractable as possible, we
will not specify in detail the nature of these ex-post negotiations and will simply assume that the
firm will obtain a share  of the incremental contribution in equation (5) when the supplier is
integrated, while only a share    of that surplus when the supplier is a stand-alone firm.
7The assumption that the firm is able to complete any production stage with incompatible inputs may seem
strong but it can be relaxed by considering environments with partial contractibility, as in Grossman and Helpman
(2005). For instance, if a fraction of the suppliers’ investments is verifiable and contractible, then the firm could use
a formal contract to ensure the provision of a minimum amount of compatible input services from the supplier and
the production process would never stall.
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We now summarize the timeline of the game played by the firm and the continuum of suppliers:8
• The firm posts contracts for suppliers for each stage  ∈ [0 1] of the production process. The
contract stipulates the organizational form — integration within the boundaries of the firm or
arm’s-length outsourcing — under which the potential supplier will operate.
• Suppliers apply for each contract and the firm chooses one supplier for each production stage.
• Production takes place sequentially. At the beginning of each stage , the supplier is handed
the final good completed up to that stage. After observing the value of this unfinished product
(i.e.,  () in (4)), the supplier chooses an input level, (). At the end of the stage, the firm
and supplier  bargain over the addition to total revenue that supplier  has contributed at
stage  (i.e., 0 () in (5)), and the firm pays the supplier.
• Output of the final good is realized once the final stage is completed. The total revenue,
1−, from the sale of the final good is collected by the firm.
Before describing the equilibrium of this game, it is worth pausing to discuss further our as-
sumptions regarding the sequential nature of contracting and payments. Notice, in particular, that
we have assumed that the firm and the supplier bargain only at stage  and that the terms of
exchange are not renegotiated at a later stage and do not reflect the outcome of subsequent negoti-
ations. If negotiations with all suppliers occurred after the final stage of production, once all inputs
had been produced in their natural order, then it is straightforward to see that, given our symme-
try assumptions, all suppliers would obtain the same payoﬀ and the optimal organizational form
would be independent of the position of an input in the value chain (see Acemoglu et al., 2007),
a prediction that is inconsistent with our later empirical results.9 In practice, however, suppliers
might be reluctant to agree to be paid long after they have delivered their inputs if they fear that
the firm might at that point renege on any previously agreed transfers.10 For the same reason, we
rule out ex-ante transfers between the firm and suppliers in the benchmark model, although we
show later in Section 3.1 that our key result is robust to their inclusion.
Even when bargaining is bilateral and sequential, one could argue that with common knowledge
of the technology in (1), suppliers might anticipate that their ultimate contribution to sales revenue
is diﬀerent from 0 () on account of the eﬀect of their investment on downstream stages, and they
might insist that negotiations at stage  be based on a division of their ultimate contribution. In
Section 3.1, we show that our main results are surprisingly robust to allowing suppliers to anticipate
the eﬀect of their decisions on subsequent negotiations between the firm and downstream suppliers.
8Although we focus throughout on a version of the model with a continuum of production stages, our equilibrium
corresponds to the limit → 0 of a discrete game in which  suppliers each control a measurable range  = 1 of
the continuum of intermediate inputs. See Acemoglu et al. (2007) for an analogous derivation.
9The reason is that once all inputs have been produced following their natural order, the production function in
(1) becomes symmetric in all its arguments, and thus multilateral negotiations should not deliver asymmetric payoﬀs
across suppliers. Acemoglu et al. (2007) solve for the Shapley value of this multilateral bargaining game and show
that suppliers end up sharing equally a fraction  (+ ) of final-good revenue.
10One could formalize this insight by introducing limited commitment frictions on the part of the firm into our
model (as in Hart and Moore, 1994, or Thomas and Worrall, 1994).
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2.2 Equilibrium Firm Behavior
A. Supplier Investment in Stage 
We now characterize the subgame perfect equilibrium of the game described above. We start
by solving for the investment level of a particular stage- supplier, taking as given the value of
production up to that stage and the chosen organizational mode for that stage. Denote by  ()
the share of the incremental contribution 0 () that accrues to the firm in its bargaining with
supplier . Our previous discussion implies that:
 () =
⎧
⎨
⎩
 if the firm outsources stage 
   if the firm integrates stage 
.
The stage- supplier obtains the remaining share 1−  () ∈ [0 1] of 0 (), and thus chooses an
investment level () to solve:
max() () = (1−  ())


¡1−¢ ()− () − (), (6)
which delivers:
 () =
"
(1−  ()) 
¡1−¢

# 1
1−
 () −(1−) . (7)
The investment made by supplier is naturally increasing in the demand level, , the productivity
 of the firm, and the supplier’s bargaining share, 1 −  (), while it decreases in the investment
marginal cost, . Hence, other things equal, an outsourcing relationship (corresponding to a lower
 ()) promotes higher investments on the part of supplier. The eﬀect of the value of production
secured up to stage (and thus of all investment decisions in prior stages, {()}=0) is more subtle.
If   , then investment choices are sequential complements in the sense that higher investment
levels by prior suppliers, as summarized in  (), increase the marginal return of supplier ’s own
investment. Conversely, if   , investment choices are sequential substitutes because high values
of upstream investments reduce the marginal return to investing in (). Throughout the paper,
we shall thus refer to    as the complements case and to    as the substitutes case.
Since  ∈ (0 1), it is straightforward to verify that from a purely technological point of view,
supplier investments are always (weakly) complementary. More precisely, in light of equation (1),
 () is necessarily nondecreasing in the investment decisions of other suppliers 0 6= . Why
is  () then negatively aﬀected by prior investments when   ? The key reason is that, when
  1, the firm faces a downward-sloping demand curve for its product and thus prior upstream
investments also aﬀect  () on account of the induced movements along the demand curve. When
 is very small, the firm’s revenue function is highly concave in quality-adjusted output and thus
marginal revenue falls at a relatively fast rate along the value chain. In other words, in industries
where firms enjoy significant market power, large upstream investment levels can significantly reduce
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the value of undertaking downstream investments, thus eﬀectively turning supplier investments into
sequential substitutes. Equation (7) illustrates that this eﬀect will dominate the standard physical
output complementarity eﬀect whenever the elasticity of demand faced by the firm is lower than
the elasticity of substitution across inputs, namely when   .
B. Suppliers’ Investments Along the Value Chain
Equation (7) characterizes supplier ’s investment level as a function of  (), the value of pro-
duction up to stage . We next solve for  () as a function of the primitives of the model and
obtain the equilibrium investment levels of all suppliers along the value chain. To achieve this, first
plug equation (7) into (5) to obtain:
0() = 
µ
(1−  ()) 

¶ 
1− (1−)(1−) () −(1−) . (8)
This constitutes a diﬀerential equation in (), which is easily solved by noting that it is separable
in () and (). Using the initial condition (0) = 0, we have:
() = 
µ
1− 
1− 
¶ (1−)(1−) µ

¶ 
1− ∙Z 
0
(1− ()) 1−
¸ (1−)(1−)  (9)
Equation (9) illustrates how the value of production secured up to stage  depends on all upstream
organizational decisions, namely the () for   . Finally, plugging this solution into (7) yields:
() = 
µ
1− 
1− 
¶ −(1−) ³

´ 1
1−  1− (1− ()) 11−
∙Z 
0
(1− ()) 1− 
¸ −(1−)
. (10)
From this expression, it is clear that the outsourcing of stage (i.e., choosing () =    )
enhances investment by that stage’s supplier, while the dependence of () on the prior (upstream)
organizational choices of the firm crucially depends on whether investment decisions are sequential
complements (  ) or sequential substitutes (  ). In choosing its optimal organizational
structure, the firm will weigh these considerations together with the fact that outsourcing of any
stage is associated with capturing a lower share of surplus and thus extracting less quasi-rents from
suppliers. We next turn to study this optimal organizational structure formally.
C. Optimal Organizational Structure
The firm seeks to maximize the amount of revenue it obtains when the good is sold net of all
payments made to suppliers along the value chain. The firm’s profits can thus be evaluated as
 = R 10 ()0(), which after substituting in the expressions from (8) and (9) is given by:
 = 
µ
1− 
1− 
¶ −(1−) µ

¶ 
1− Z 1
0
()(1− ()) 1−
∙Z 
0
(1− ()) 1−
¸ −(1−)  (11)
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It is in turn easily verified that the payoﬀ () obtained by suppliers (see equation (6)) is always
strictly positive, so their participation constraint can be ignored.
The firm’s decision problem is then to choose the values of () ∈ {  } for  ∈ [0 1]
that maximize  . In order to determine if integration or outsourcing is optimal at a given stage
, it proves useful to follow the approach in Antra`s and Helpman (2004, 2008) and consider the
hypothetical case in which the firm could freely choose () from the continuum of values in [0 1].
After some simplification, the partial derivative of  with respect to () can be written as:

() = 

1− (1− ()) 1−−1Φ()
where:
Φ() =
µ
1−  ()
1− 
¶ ∙Z 
0
(1− ()) 1−
¸ −(1−)
− − 
(1− ) (1− )
Z 1

()(1− ()) 1−
∙Z 
0
(1− ()) 1−
¸ −(1−)−1 . (12)
and  ≡  
³
1−
1−
´ −(1−) ¡

¢ 
1− is a positive constant.
The function Φ() captures how the firm’s incentives to raise or lower the bargaining share
 () depend on the particular production stage  ∈ [0 1] under consideration. It consists of two
terms. The first term captures the balance of the rent extraction and stage-m incentive eﬀects of a
higher bargaining power for the firm. Intuitively, a higher  () increases the rents captured by the
firm at stage , but it also reduces the incentives to invest of the stage- supplier. Absent other
considerations, the bargaining share that optimally trades oﬀ these two eﬀects would be given by
∗ () = 1−, which decreases in  due to the fact that the elasticity of a supplier ’s investment
in response to a reduction in this agent’s bargaining share is higher the more substitutable are
inputs along the value chain (see equation (10)). As is clear from equation (12), the size of these
first two eﬀects depends on the stage  under consideration because the incremental surplus over
which the firm and the supplier negotiate varies along the value chain: as argued above, it increases
with  in the complements case, but decreases in  in the substitutes case.
The second term in (12) represents the downstream incentive eﬀect of an increase in  (),
namely its eﬀects on the incentives to invest of all suppliers that are positioned downstream rel-
ative to supplier . As explained in the discussion of equation (10), this eﬀect is negative in the
complements case, but is positive in the substitutes case, since in the latter case, a lower investment
at stage  will increase the incentives to invest of downstream suppliers. Importantly, the absolute
size of this last eﬀect also depends on , it being naturally larger when  is low, i.e., when a given
stage precedes a relatively large number of other production stages.
Setting Φ () = 0, we then have that the (hypothetical) optimal division of surplus at stage ,
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which we denote by ∗ (), is given by:
∗ () = max
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎩
1− −
−
1−
R 1
 ()(1− ())

1−
hR 
0 (1− ())

1−
i −(1−)−1 hR
0 (1− ())

1−
i −(1−)  0
⎫
⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎭
. (13)
This expression may seem complicated, but straightforward diﬀerentiation indicates that (see Ap-
pendix for a proof):
Lemma 1 The (unconstrained) optimal bargaining share ∗ () is a weakly increasing function of
 in the complements case (  ), while it is a weakly decreasing function of  in the substitutes
case (  ).
In words, Lemma 1 states that whether the incentive for the firm to retain a larger surplus share
increases or decreases along the value chain hinges on the relative sizes of the parameters  and ,
which in turn govern the three eﬀects discussed above. Intuitively, when  is high relative to ,
integrating early stages of production is particularly costly because this reduces the incentives to
invest not only of these early suppliers but also of all suppliers downstream. Although integration
allows the firm to capture some rents, the incremental surplus over which the firm and the supplier
negotiate is particularly small in these early stages of production. Conversely, when  is small
relative to , outsourcing is particularly costly in upstream stages because high investments early
in the value chain lead to reduced incentives to invest for downstream suppliers, while the firm
captures a disproportionate amount of surplus by integrating these early stages.
Another way to convey this intuition is by comparing the supplier’s investment levels in the
complete versus incomplete contracting environments. As we have seen earlier, in the former case,
the firm would choose quality-contingent contracts to elicit a common value of input services for
all suppliers in the value chain. Instead, with incomplete contracting, if the bargaining weight
 () was common for all stages, investment levels would be increasing along the value chain for
   and decreasing along the value chain for    (see equation (7)). The optimal choice of
 () in (13) can thus be understood as a second-best instrument that attenuates the distortions
arising from incomplete contracting, by rebalancing investment levels towards those that would be
chosen in the absence of contracting frictions. In the complements case, this involves eliciting more
supplier investment in the early stages through outsourcing, and (possibly) integrating the most
downstream suppliers to dampen the relative overinvestment in these latter stages; an analogous
logic applies in the substitutes case.
Evaluating the function ∗ () at both ends of the unit interval, we obtain that lim→0 ∗ () =
0 when    and lim→0 ∗ () = 1 when   , while ∗ (1) = 1−  regardless of the relative
magnitude of  and  (see the proof of Proposition 2 in the Appendix). This implies that when
the firm is constrained to choose  () from the pair of values  and , the decision of whether
or not to integrate the most upstream stages depends on the relative size of  and . In the
complements case, the firm would select the minimum possible value of  () at  = 0, which
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corresponds to choosing outsourcing in this initial stage and, by continuity, in a measurable set
of the most upstream stages. Conversely, in the substitutes case, the firm necessarily chooses to
integrate these initial stages. As for the most downstream stages, the decision is less clear-cut. In
both cases, if   1 −  = ∗ (1), then it is clear that that last stage will be integrated, while
it will necessarily be outsourced if   1 − . When   1 −   , whether stages in the
immediate neighborhood of  = 1 are integrated or not depends on other parameter restrictions
(see Appendix).
To summarize, when    the firm will necessarily outsource relatively upstream inputs, while
it may (depending on parameter values) find it optimal to integrate the most downstream inputs.
Conversely, when    the firm will necessarily integrate relatively upstream inputs, and may
(depending on parameter values) outsource the most downstream inputs. Figure 2 depicts the
function ∗ ()whenever   1 −   , in which case there is the potential for integrated
and outsourced stages to coexist along the value chain in both the sequential complements and
substitutes cases.
m
1
0
1
*(m)
1‐
m
1
0
Complements Case Substitutes Case
1
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Figure 2: Profit-Maximizing Division of Surplus for Stage 
Our discussion so far has focused on the optimal organizational mode for stages at both ends of
the value chain. In the Appendix, we show that the set of stages under a common organizational
form (integration or outsourcing) is necessarily a connected interval in [0 1], thus implying:
Proposition 2 In the complements case (  ), there exists a unique ∗ ∈ (0 1], such that: (i)
all production stages  ∈ [0∗) are outsourced; and (ii) all stages  ∈ [∗  1] are integrated
within firm boundaries. In the substitutes case (  ), there exists a unique ∗ ∈ (0 1], such
that: (i) all production stages  ∈ [0∗) are integrated within firm boundaries; and (ii) all stages
 ∈ [∗  1] are outsourced.
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Given that  () takes on at most two values along the value chain, one can in fact derive a
closed-form solution for the cut-oﬀ stages, ∗ and ∗, in terms of the parameters ,  ,  and
 (see Appendix for details):
∗ = min
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
⎡
⎢⎢⎣1 +
µ
1− 
1− 
¶ 
1−
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
⎛
⎜⎝
1− 
1−
³
1−
1−
´− 
1−
⎞
⎟⎠
(1−)
−
− 1
⎤
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎥⎥⎦
−1
 1
⎫
⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎭
(14)
and
∗ = min
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣1 +
µ
1− 
1− 
¶ 
1−
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
⎛
⎜⎝
³
1−
1−
´− 
1− − 1
 − 1
⎞
⎟⎠
(1−)
−
− 1
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦
−1
 1
⎫
⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎭
, (15)
where remember that    .11 With these expressions, we can then establish:
Proposition 3 Whenever integration and outsourcing coexist along the value chain (i.e., ∗ ∈
(0 1) when    or ∗ ∈ (0 1) when   ), a decrease in  will necessarily expand the range of
stages that are vertically integrated.
The negative eﬀect of  on integration is explained by the fact that when the firm has relatively
high market power (low ), it will tend to place a relatively high weight on the rent-extraction
motive for integration and will thus be less concerned with the investment ineﬃciencies caused by
such integration.
3 Extensions and Empirical Implementation
Our Benchmark Model is stylized along several directions and omits many factors that have been
shown to be important for the organizational decisions of firms in the global economy. In this
section, we outline four extensions that help us further connect our Benchmark Model to the
global sourcing framework in Antra`s and Helpman (2004, 2008). This will also serve to justify
the regression specification and several control variables that we will adopt later in our empirical
analysis. For simplicity, we develop these extensions one at a time, although they could readily be
incorporated in a unified framework.
11Using (14) and (15), it is straightforward to derive the parameter restrictions that characterize when the cutoﬀ
lies strictly in the interior of (0 1): In the complements case, ∗ ∈ (0 1) if  (1− )(1−)  (1−)(1−),
while ∗ = 1 otherwise. In the substitutes case, ∗ ∈ (0 1) if  (1 −  )(1−)  (1 − )(1−), while∗ = 1 otherwise (see the Appendix).
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3.1 Alternative Contracting Assumptions
A. Ex-Ante Transfers
We begin by exploring the robustness of our results to alternative contracting assumptions. We first
consider the implications of allowing for ex-ante transfers between the firm and suppliers, which
naturally aﬀect the ex-ante division of surplus between agents. (To conserve space, we focus on
outlining the main results and relegate all mathematical details to the Online Appendix.)
In our Benchmark Model, the optimal choice of ownership structure followed from the balance
of three eﬀects, which we labeled the rent extraction, stage-m investment and downstream incentive
eﬀects. The first of these eﬀects is tightly related to our assumption that the firm and its suppliers
are not allowed to exchange lump-sum transfers in the initial contract, so that organizational
decisions that raise the ex-post bargaining power of suppliers necessarily reduce the ex-ante profits
of the firm. If such ex-ante transfers were allowed, the rent extraction eﬀect would be eliminated,
since the firm could then allocate ex-post power to suppliers via ownership decisions, while still
capturing all rents ex-ante via lump-sum transfers from suppliers. Formally, the choice of ownership
structure would now seek to maximize the joint surplus created along the value chain,
 = 1−
µZ 1
0
 () 
¶
−
Z 1
0
 ()  (16)
rather than just the ex-post surplus obtained by the firm, as in equation (11).
Importantly, the presence of ex-ante transfers has no eﬀect on investment levels, which are still
given by (10) and thus feature the same distortions as in our Benchmark Model. In particular,
supposing that bargaining weights were constant (i.e., () = ), investment levels would continue
to increase along the value chain in the complements case (  ), while they would continue to
decrease along the value chain in the substitutes case (  ). As a result, when studying the
hypothetical case in which the firm could freely choose () from the continuum of values in [0 1]
to maximize (16), we find that the marginal return to raising () is once again increasing in
 for    and decreasing in  for    (see the Online Appendix). In words, even in the
presence of lump-sum transfers, the central result of our paper remains intact: the incentive to
integrate suppliers is highest for downstream suppliers in the complements case, while it is highest
for upstream suppliers in the substitutes case.
There is however one key diﬀerence that emerges relative to the Benchmark Model. With
ex-ante transfers, we find that integration and outsourcing coexist along the value chain only
when   , in which case the firm integrates the most upstream stages and outsources the most
downstream ones.12 On the other hand, when   , although the incentive to integrate suppliers
is highest for downstream suppliers, the firm nevertheless finds it optimal to outsource all stages
of production (including the most downstream ones), regardless of the values of  and  (see
12The cutoﬀ stage separating the upstream integrated stages from the downstream outsourced stages can in fact
be shown to be unique and to lie strictly in the interior of (0 1). (See the Online Appendix.)
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Online Appendix for details). The intuition is simple: given that the firm can extract surplus
from suppliers in a nondistortionary manner via ex-ante transfers, the use of integration for rent
extraction purposes is now ineﬃcient. When   , the firm will also use ex-ante transfers to
extract surplus from suppliers, but integration of upstream suppliers continues to be attractive
because it serves a diﬀerent role in providing incentives to invest for downstream suppliers, as in
our Benchmark Model.
B. Linkages Across Bargaining Rounds
We next explore environments in which suppliers anticipate the eﬀect of their decisions on sub-
sequent negotiations between the firm and downstream suppliers, thereby aﬀecting the ex-post
division of surplus between the firm and suppliers.
In our Benchmark Model, we have assumed that the firm and the supplier in each stage 
bargain only over the marginal addition of that supplier to production value, as captured by 0 ()
in (5), independently of the bilateral negotiations that take place at other stages. This seems a
sensible assumption to make in environments in which suppliers might not have precise information
over what other suppliers in the value chain do, but formally introducing incomplete information
into our model would greatly complicate the analysis. Instead, in this section, we will stick to our
assumption that all players have common knowledge of the structure and payoﬀs of the game, but
we will briefly characterize the subgame perfect equilibrium of a more complicated game in which
suppliers internalize the eﬀect of their investment levels and their negotiations with the firm on the
subsequent negotiations between the firm and downstream suppliers.
In order to do so, it becomes important to specify precisely the implications of an (oﬀ-the-
equilibrium path) decision by a supplier to refuse to deliver its input to the firm. Remember that
we have assumed that the firm has the ability to costlessly produce any type of incompatible input,
so such a breach of contract would not drive firm revenues to zero. The key issue is: what is
the eﬀect of such a deviation on the productivity of downstream suppliers? In order to consider
spillovers from some bargaining stages to others, the simplest case to study is one in which once
the production process incorporates an incompatible input (say because a supplier refused to trade
with the firm), all downstream inputs are necessarily incompatible as well, and thus their marginal
product is zero and firm revenue remains at () if the deviation happened at stage . (In the
Online Appendix, we outline the complications that arise from studying less extreme environments.)
With these assumptions then, the supplier at stage  realizes that by not delivering its input,
the firm will not only lose an amount of revenue equal to 0 (), but will also lose its share of the
value from all subsequent additions of compatible inputs by suppliers positioned downstream of
. This problem clearly takes on a recursive nature, since the negotiations between the firm and
supplier at any given stage will be shaped by all negotiations that take place further downstream.
To formally characterize the subgame perfect equilibrium of this game, we first develop a discrete-
player version of the game in which each of   0 suppliers controls a measure 1 of the
production stages, and then study its behavior in the limit as  → ∞. In the Online Appendix,
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we show that the profits obtained by the -th supplier ( = 1    ) are given by
 () = (1−  ())
−X
=0
 ( ) (( + )− ( + − 1))− 1(), (17)
where
 ( ) =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
1 if  = 0
+Y
=+1
 () if  ≥ 1 , (18)
and the discrete-player analogue of the revenue function is () = 1−
hP
=1 1 ()
i 
. Note
that from a Taylor approximation, we have
( + )− ( + − 1) ≈ 1− 
"+−1X
=1
1
()

# −
1
 ( + )
 for all  ≥ 0. (19)
The key diﬀerence relative to our Benchmark Model is that the payoﬀ to a given supplier in
equation (17) is now not only a fraction 1 −  () of the supplier’s own direct contribution to
production value, ()− (− 1), but also incorporates a share  ( ) of the direct contribution
of each supplier located  ≥ 1 positions downstream from . Note, however, that the share of
supplier  + ’s direct contribution captured by  quickly falls in the distance between  and
 +  (see equation (18)).
At first glance, it may appear that the introduction of linkages across bargaining stages greatly
complicates the choice of investment levels along the value chain. This is for at least two rea-
sons. First, the choice of investment  () will now be shaped not just by the marginal return
of those investments on supplier ’s own direct contribution, but also by the marginal return to
those investments made in subsequent stages. Second, this will in turn lead upstream suppliers
to internalize the eﬀect of their investments on the investment decisions of suppliers downstream.
These two eﬀects are apparent from inspection of equations (17) and (19).
In the Online Appendix we show, however, that when considering the limiting case of a con-
tinuum of suppliers ( → ∞), these eﬀects become negligible, and remarkably, the investment
choices that maximize  () in equation (17) end up being identical to those in the Benchmark
Model. This is despite the fact that the actual ex-post payoﬀs obtained by suppliers are distinct
and necessarily higher than those in the Benchmark Model. The intuition behind this result is that
the eﬀect of a supplier’s investment on its own direct contribution is of a diﬀerent order of magni-
tude from its eﬀects on other suppliers’ direct contributions, as illustrated by equation (19). In the
limit as  →∞, the latter eﬀect is negligible, whereas the former eﬀect remains measurable (see
equation (5) in combination with (4)). In sum, investment levels are only relevant insofar as they
aﬀect a supplier’s own direct contribution, and thus this variant of the model ends up delivering
the exact same levels of supplier investments as in the Benchmark Model.
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Since investment levels are identical to those in the Benchmark Model, the total surplus gener-
ated along the value chain will also remain unaltered. Provided that the firm and its suppliers have
access to ex-ante transfers in the initial contract, this variant of the model will generate the exact
same predictions as our Benchmark Model extended to include lump-sum transfers, as outlined in
subsection 3.1.A above. In the absence of such ex-ante transfers, however, the choice of ownership
structure becomes significantly more complicated due to the fact that the ex-post rents obtained
by the firm in a given stage are now lower than in the Benchmark Model, and more so the more
upstream the stage in question. Other things equal, this generates an additional incentive for the
firm to integrate relatively upstream suppliers, regardless of the relative size of  and . Unfortu-
nately, an explicit formula for  and  cannot be obtained in the limiting case  → ∞, thus
precluding an analytical characterization of the ownership structure choice along the value chain.
3.2 Headquarter Intensity
We next consider the introduction of investment decisions on the part of the firm. As first discussed
by Antra`s (2003), to the extent that final-good producers or ‘headquarters’ undertake significant
noncontractible, relationship-specific investments in production, their willingness to give up bar-
gaining power via outsourcing will be tampered by the negative eﬀect of those decisions on the
provision of headquarter services. The relative intensity of headquarter services in production thus
emerges as a crucial determinant of the integration decision (see also Antra`s and Helpman, 2004,
2008). It is straightforward to incorporate these considerations into our framework. In particular,
consider the case in which the production function from (1) is modified to:
 = 
µ

¶ µZ 1
0
µ ()
1− 
¶
I () 
¶1−
,  ∈ (0 1), (20)
where recall that () is an indicator function equal to 1 if and only if input  is produced after all
inputs upstream of  have been procured. Suppose also that the provision of headquarter services,
, by the firm is undertaken at marginal cost  after suppliers have been hired, but before they
have undertaken any stage investments. For instance, one could think of these headquarter services
as R&D or managerial inputs that need to be performed before the sourcing of inputs along the
supply chain can commence. As in the case of the investments by suppliers, we assume that ex-ante
contracts on headquarter services are not enforceable and we rule out ex-ante transfers to facilitate
comparison with our Benchmark Model.
Because the investment in  is sunk by the time the firm sequentially bargains with suppliers, the
introduction of headquarter services does not alter the above analysis too much. In particular,the
value of production generated up to stage  when all inputs are compatible is now given by:
() = 1−
µ

¶
(1− )−˜
∙Z 
0
()
¸ ˜
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where ˜ ≡ (1− ) . It is then immediate that one can follow the same steps as in previous sections
to conclude that the dependence of the integration decision on the index of a production stage ()
crucially depends on the relative magnitude of ˜ ≡ (1− )  and . As before, a high value of 
relative to  leads to a higher desirability of integrating relatively downstream production stages,
while the converse is true when  is low relative to . What this extension illustrates is that these
eﬀects of  need to be conditioned on the headquarter intensity of the industry. In particular, we
should see a greater propensity towards integrating downstream stages when  is high and  is low,
with the converse being true when  is low and  is high.
Beyond this eﬀect, our model also predicts that a higher headquarter intensity (higher ) will
also have a positive “level” eﬀect (across all stages) in the integration decision, for reasons analogous
to those laid out in previous contributions to the property-rights theory. To see this formally, notice
that Propositions 2 and 3 will continue to hold with ˜ ≡ (1− )  replacing  both in the statements
of the Propositions as well as in the formulas for ∗ and ∗ in (14) and (15). Hence, whenever
our model predicts a coexistence of integration and outsourcing along the value chain, an increase
in  will necessarily expand the range of stages that are vertically integrated.13
We summarize these results as follows (see Appendix for a formal proof):
Proposition 4 In the presence of headquarter services provided by the firm, the results in Propo-
sitions 2 and 3 continue to hold except for the fact that: (i) the complements and substitutes cases
are now defined by ˜ ≡ (1− )    and ˜ ≡ (1− )   , respectively, and (ii) the range of
stages that are vertically integrated is now also (weakly) increasing in .
3.3 Firm Heterogeneity and Prevalence of Integration
Up to now, we have considered the problem of a single firm in isolation. We now show that our
model can be readily embedded in an industry equilibrium, in which firms produce a continuum of
diﬀerentiated final-good varieties that consumers value according to the utility function in (2).
On the technology side, each firm within the industry produces one final-good variety under
the same technology and sequencing of production stages in (1). Following Melitz (2003), we
let firms diﬀer in their productivity parameter . As is commonly done, we assume  is drawn
independently for each firm from an underlying Pareto distribution with shape parameter  and
minimum threshold , namely:
 () = 1− () for  ≥   0, (21)
where  is inversely related to the variance of  (·) and is assumed high enough to ensure a finite
variance of the size distribution of firms. We further introduce a fixed organizational cost  ()
associated with each production stage  ∈ [0 1]. For simplicity, we let the firm pay these fixed
13The counterpart of this result is that that the unconstrained optimal bargaining share ∗() spelled out in (13)
is decreasing in ˜ in both the complements and substitutes cases, which implies a greater propensity to integrate each
stage  the higher is .
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costs (or a large enough fraction of them to ensure that no supplier’s participation constraint is
violated). The values that these fixed costs can take are symmetric for all stages, varying only
with the organizational structure chosen by the firm for each given stage. More specifically, and
following the arguments in Antra`s and Helpman (2004), we assume that:
  
reflecting the relatively high managerial overload associated with running an integrated relationship
with an input supplier.
The introduction of productivity heterogeneity and fixed costs of production enriches the choice
of ownership structure relative to our Benchmark Model. We relegate most mathematical details to
the Appendix and focus here on describing the main results. Consider first the complements case
(  ). As in the Benchmark Model, the incentive for the firm to integrate a given production
stage is larger the more downstream the stage, and again there exists a cutoﬀ  ∈ (0 1] such that
all stages before  are outsourced and all stages after  (if any) are integrated. The presence
of fixed costs means however that when   1, this threshold is now implicitly defined by:
() −(1−)
⎡
⎣
µ
1− 
¶
−
Ã
1−
µ
1− 
1− 
¶ 
1−
!"
1 +
µ
1− 
1− 
¶ 
1− µ1−

¶# −(1−)⎤
⎦ =  − Ψ 1− ,
(22)
where Ψ ≡ (1−)(1−) (1− )

1− is a constant,  being the analogous constant from our Bench-
mark Model given in (12).
It can be shown that the left-hand-side of (22) is increasing in  whenever we have an interior
solution, and thus the threshold  is now a decreasing function of the level of firm productivity
. Intuitively, relatively more productive firms will find it easier to amortize the extra fixed cost
associated with integrating stages, and thus will tend to integrate a larger number of stages. Fur-
thermore, when  →∞, the eﬀect of fixed costs on firm profits becomes negligible and the threshold
 converges to the one in the Benchmark Model (i.e., ∗ in equation (14)). Following analogous
steps (see the Appendix), it is straightforward to verify that in the substitutes case (  ), there
exists again a threshold  ∈ (0 1] such that all stages upstream from  are integrated and all
stages downstream from  (if any) are outsourced. Furthermore,  is increasing in firm produc-
tivity , so again relatively more profitable firms tend to integrate a larger interval of production
stages.
Figure 3 illustrates these results. In both panels of the Figure it is assumed that the firms with
the lowest values of productivity (in the neighborhood of ) do not find it profitable to integrate any
production stage .14 As productivity increases, more and more stages become integrated, with
these stages being the most downstream ones in the complements case, but the most upstream ones
in the substitutes case. Furthermore, both panels illustrate that even when productivity becomes
14We assume that  is low to ensure that the firms with the lowest productivity level  will outsource all stages.
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Figure 3: Firm Heterogeneity and the Integration Decision
arbitrarily large, the firm might want to keep some production stages (the most upstream ones in
the complements case, and vice versa in the substitutes case) under an outsourcing contract.
A key implication of firm heterogeneity is that it generates smooth predictions for the prevalence
of integration in production stages with diﬀerent indices , a feature that will facilitate our transi-
tion to the empirical analysis in the next section. More specifically, notice that in the complements
case (  ), we have that input   ∗ will be integrated by all firms with productivity higher
than the threshold  (), where  is the productivity value for which equation (22) holds; the
input  will in turn be outsourced by all firms with    (). (Inputs with an index   ∗
will not be integrated by any firms.) Appealing to the Pareto distribution in (21), we thus have
that the share of firms integrating stage  is given by
 () =
⎧
⎨
⎩
0 if  ≤ ∗
( ()) if   ∗
 (23)
From our previous discussion, it is clear that  () is a decreasing function of , and thus the
share of firms integrating stage  is weakly increasing in the downstreamness of that stage. Notice
also that because    (), the share of integrating firms is decreasing in  and thus increasing
in the dispersion of the productivity distribution, a result that very much resonates with those
derived by Helpman et al. (2004) and Antra`s and Helpman (2004).
Following analogous steps for the substitutes case, we can conclude that:
Proposition 5 The share of firms integrating a particular stage  is weakly increasing in the
downstreamness of that stage in the complements case (  ), while it is decreasing in the
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downstreamness of the stage in the substitutes case (  ). Furthermore, the share of firms
integrating a particular stage  is weakly increasing in the dispersion of productivity within the
industry.
Proposition 5 converts our previous results on the within-firm variation in the propensity to
integrate diﬀerent stages into predictions regarding the relative prevalence of integration of an
input when aggregating over the decisions of all firms within an industry. This is an important step
because our empirical application will use industry-level data on intrafirm trade. It is moreover
worth stressing that the modeling of final-good producer heterogeneity highlights that, to the
extent that fixed costs of integration are relatively high, the set of stages that will be integrated by
final-good producers will be relatively small. In such a case, our model would predict that in the
sequential complements case, only a few very downstream stages will be integrated, while in the
sequential substitutes case, only a few very upstream stages will be integrated. We will come back
to this observation in our empirical section.
3.4 Input and Supplier Heterogeneity
So far, we have assumed that the only source of asymmetry across production stages is their
level of downstreamness. In particular, we have assumed that all inputs enter symmetrically into
production and that their production entails a common marginal cost . In the real world, however,
diﬀerent production stages have diﬀerent eﬀects on output, suppliers diﬀer in their productivity
levels, and the widespread process of oﬀshoring also implies that firms undertake diﬀerent stages
of production in various countries where prevailing local factor costs diﬀer. For these reasons, it is
important to assess the robustness of our results to the existence of asymmetries across suppliers.
To that end, we next consider a situation in which the volume of quality-adjusted final-good
production is now given by
 = 
µZ 1
0
( ()()) ()
¶1
, (24)
where  () captures asymmetries in the marginal product of diﬀerent inputs. Furthermore, let
the marginal cost of production of input  be given now by (), which can vary across inputs due
to supplier-specific productivity diﬀerences or the heterogeneity in factor costs across the country
locations in which inputs are produced.
Solving this extension in the same way as our Benchmark Model, we find that the profits the
firm obtains are instead given more generally by
 = 
µ
1− 
1− 
¶ −(1−)
() 1−
Z 1
0
()
µ
1− ()
 ()  ()
¶ 
1−
"Z 
0
µ
1− ()
 ()  ()
¶ 
1− 
# −(1−)
,
(25)
This is clearly analogous to equation (11), except for the inclusion of input asymmetries as cap-
tured by the term  ()  () for input . How do these asymmetries aﬀect the firm’s choice of
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ownership structure () ∈ {  } for each stage  ∈ [0 1]? To build intuition, it is useful once
again to treat () as a continuous variable in [0 1]. After some simplifications analogous to those
performed in the Benchmark Model, setting the partial derivative of  with respect to () equal
to 0 delivers the following expression for the optimal division of surplus ∗ ():
∗ () = max
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
1− −
−
1−
R 1
 ()
³
1−()
()()
´ 
1−
∙R 
0
³
1−()
()()
´ 
1− 
¸ −(1−)−1 
∙R 
0
³
1−()
()()
´ 
1− 
¸ −(1−)  0
⎫
⎪⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎪⎭
.
It can in fact be verified that despite the presence of heterogenous marginal products and marginal
costs along the value chain, Lemma 1 continues to apply in this richer framework and the sign of
the derivative of ∗ () with respect to  is again given by the sign of  − . The intuition for
how the optimal allocation of bargaining power varies with the stage of production  remains the
same as in the Benchmark Model. Furthermore, Proposition 2 continues to apply, though one can
no longer solve for the thresholds ∗ and ∗ in closed form.
An implication of this result is that when studying the global sourcing decisions of a firm,
our model continues to predict that the level of downstreamness of an input should be a relevant
determinant of the integration decision of that input. Furthermore, when embedding the model in
the industry equilibrium structure described in Section 3.3, Proposition 5 continues to apply even
when firms face heterogenous costs for their inputs. We can thus state:
Proposition 6 Suppose that technology allows for input heterogeneity as in (24) and that marginal
costs of production of inputs are also heterogeneous and given by  () for  ∈ [0 1]. Then the share
of firms integrating a particular stage  is weakly increasing in the downstreamness of that stage
in the complements case (  ), while it is decreasing in the downstreamness of that stage in the
substitutes case (  ). Furthermore, the share of firms integrating a particular stage  is weakly
increasing in the dispersion of productivity within the industry.
There is one important caveat to the above result. We have treated the marginal cost param-
eters,  (), as exogenous and uncorrelated with , while in reality they are partly shaped by the
endogenous location decisions of firms. To the extent that these location decisions are also shaped
by downstreamness in a systematic way, the above comparative static results regarding the eﬀect
of  on the integration decision become more complex because the level of marginal costs might
correlate with . Although this is not the focus of this paper, an analysis of the optimal location
of each stage of production and how it varies with the position of that stage in the value chain can
be carried out by computing the partial derivative of the profit function in (25) with respect to the
marginal cost  () of a given stage . Straightforward calculations indicate that the marginal
incentives for the firm to reduce the marginal cost of a given stage are indeed generally aﬀected by
the index of the production stage , but this dependence is complex and hinges on various aspects
of the model in subtle ways (details available on request).
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In our empirical analysis, we propose two ways to address this caveat. First, we will experiment
with specifications that exploit both cross-sectoral and cross-country variation in the prevalence
of integration, but we introduce country fixed eﬀects to ensure that the eﬀect of downstreamness
we identify is not estimated oﬀ cross-country variation in production costs. Still, this does not
address a potential selection bias related to the fact that certain inputs might not be sourced at all
from certain destinations precisely due to their level of downstreamness. To deal with this concern,
we will also experiment with a two-stage Heckman correction specification. We turn now to this
empirical investigation.
4 Implementing an Empirical Test
The Benchmark Model that we have developed focuses on firm organizational decisions, and thus
firm-level data would appear to be the ideal laboratory for testing it. Nevertheless, firm-level data
on integration decisions is not readily available, and while a small number of such datasets have
been used to test theories of multinational firm boundaries, these do not provide a suﬃciently
rich picture of the heterogeneous sourcing decisions of firms over a large number of inputs.15 Our
approach will instead exploit industry-level variation in the extent to which goods are transacted
across borders within or outside of firm boundaries. Although our framework has implications as
well for domestic sourcing decisions, data on international transactions are particularly accessible
due to the existence of oﬃcial records of goods crossing borders.
We describe in this section our empirical strategy based on detailed data on U.S. intrafirm im-
ports. Specifically, we will test the prediction in Proposition 5, namely that the relative prevalence
of vertical integration of an input when aggregated across the decisions of all final-good producers
purchasing that input (see equation (23)), should be a function of the average position of that
input’s use in the value chain. Needless to say, implementing such a test requires that we propose
appropriate measures for the downstreamness of an input’s use and that we provide a means to
distinguish between the sequential complements (  ) and substitutes (  ) cases. We care-
fully describe below the construction of these key variables. (Additional details on the industry
concordances used and other control variables are documented in the Data Appendix.)
4.1 Intrafirm Import Share
For our dependent variable, we follow the recent literature in using information on intrafirm trade
to capture the propensity to transact a particular input within firm boundaries. We draw this
data from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Related Party Trade Database, which reports U.S. trade
volumes at the detailed country-industry level, and more importantly, breaks down the value of
trade according to whether it was conducted with related versus non-related parties. We focus our
analysis on the U.S. import data for manufacturing industries, given the U.S.’ position as a large
15See Antra`s (2011) for a discussion of three firm-level datasets (from Japan, France, and Germany) that have been
used to test the property-rights theory of the boundaries of multinational firms.
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user of intermediates and consumer of finished goods from the rest of the world. For imports, a
related party is defined as a foreign counterpart in which the U.S. importer has at least a 6% equity
interest.16 We work with an extensive amount of data for the years 2000-2010.
For each industry, we use the share of related party imports in total U.S. imports, or (Related
Trade)/(Related Trade + Non-Related Trade), to capture the propensity of U.S. firms to integrate
foreign suppliers of that particular industrial good. We will refer to this measure as simply the
share of intrafirm imports, and we can calculate this both at the industry-year and at the exporting
country-industry-year levels. The publicly available Census Bureau data is reported at the North
American Industry Classification System (NAICS) six-digit level. To facilitate the merging with
other industry variables (especially our measures of downstreamness), we converted the related
party trade data from NAICS to 2002 Input-Output industry codes (IO2002) using the concordance
provided by the Bureau of Economics Analysis (BEA), before calculating the intrafirm import
share. As illustrated by Antra`s (2011), there is rich variation in this U.S. intrafirm import share: it
varies widely across products and origin countries, and there also exists significant variation across
products within exporting countries, as well as across exporting countries within narrowly-defined
products. In all, there were 253 IO2002 manufacturing industries for which we had data on intrafirm
imports, and that therefore made it into our eventual regression sample.17
It is further useful to point out that some trade values in the Census Bureau data are recorded
under a third category (“unreported”). These are instances where the nature of the transactions
— whether it was between related or non-related parties — could not be precisely determined. This
constitutes a very small share of total trade flows, and is a reason of concern only for observations
with small trade volumes where “unreported” flows might contribute to measurement error in the
intrafirm trade shares that we calculate.18 We will return to this point later below when discussing
our empirical findings.
4.2 Downstreamness
Our model emphasizes a novel explanatory variable, namely the relative location of an industry
along the value chain. We propose two alternative measures to capture the “downstreamness” of
an industry in production processes. As we do not have information on the sequencing of stages
for individual technologies, we instead turn to the 2002 Input-Output Tables to obtain average
measures of the relative position of each industry in U.S. production processes.
16While this is lower than the conventional 10% cutoﬀ used by the IMF to determine whether a foreign ownership
stake qualifies as FDI, extracts from the confidential direct investment dataset collected by the BEA nevertheless
suggest that related party trade is generally associated with one of the entities having a controlling stake in the other
entity; see Nunn and Trefler (2008).
17This is out of a maximum possible of 279. Several industries dropped out due to the absence of trade data in
the original Census Bureau dataset. A handful of industries were also merged in the process of the mapping from
NAICS; see the Data Appendix for more details.
18The share of U.S. manufacturing imports recorded as “unreported” is below 0.2% in all the years in our sample.
Furthermore, using the industry-year observations, we find a raw negative correlation of −0.203 between the log of
the share of “unreported” trade and the log of total imports for the IO2002 manufacturing industries.
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To build intuition on these measures, recall the basic input-output identity:
 =  + ,
where  is total output in industry ,  is the output of  that goes towards final consumption
and investment (“final use”), and  is the use of ’s output as inputs to other industries (or its
“total use” as an input). In a world with  industries, this identity can be expanded as follows:
 =  +
X
=1
| {z }
direct use of  as input
+
X
=1
X
=1
 +
X
=1
X
=1
X
=1
 + | {z }
indirect use of  as input
, (26)
where  for a pair of industries ( ), 1 ≤   ≤  , is the amount of  used as an input in
producing one dollar worth of industry ’s output. Note that the second term on the right-hand
side of (26) captures the value of ’s “direct use” as an input, namely the total value of  purchased
by industry  to produce output that immediately goes to final use. The remaining terms that
involve higher-order summations reflect the “indirect use” of  as an input, as these enter further
upstream in the value chain, at least two production stages away from final use. The above can be
written in compact matrix form by stacking the identity for all industries :
 =  + +2 +3 +    = [ −]−1  , (27)
where  and  are the  × 1 vectors whose -th entries are respectively  and , while  is the
 × direct requirements matrix whose ( )-th entry is  . Note that [ −]−1 is often called
the Leontief inverse matrix.19
Our first measure of downstreamness,  , is the ratio of aggregate direct use to ag-
gregate total use of  as an input.20 Specifically, this is calculated by dividing the -th element of
the column vector  (i.e., the value of ’s direct use as an input for final-use production, summed
over all buyer industries ) by the -th element of  −  (which equals the total use value of  as
an input, summed over all buyer industries ). The higher is   for a given industry ,
the more intensive is its use as a direct input for final-use production, so that the bulk of ’s value
enters into production relatively far downstream. Conversely, a low value of   would
indicate that most of the contribution of input  to production processes occurs indirectly, namely
in more upstream stages.
In terms of implementation, we draw on the detailed Use Table issued by the BEA in the 2002
U.S. Input-Output Tables to construct the direct requirements matrix, . We also constructed
the final-use vector,  , by summing over the value of each industry ’s output purchased for
19This inverse exists so long as

=1   1 for all , a natural assumption given the economic interpretation of
the  ’s as input requirement coeﬃcients.
20See Alfaro and Charlton (2009) and di Giovanni and Levchenko (2010) for measures of production line position
that have a similar flavor.
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consumption and investment by private or government entities (IO2002 codes starting with “F”),
but excluding net changes in inventories (F03000), exports (F04000), and imports (F05000). Lastly,
the output vector,  , was obtained by taking the sum of all entries in row  in the Use Table (this
being equal to gross output ). We applied an open-economy and inventories adjustment to the
entries of  and  , to account for the fact that inter-industry flows across borders (as well as in
and out of inventories) are not directly observed.21 (For a detailed discussion of this adjustment,
please see Antra`s et al. (2012).)
We supplement our analysis with a second measure of downstreamness, , which
seeks to make fuller use of the information on indirect input use further upstream. To motivate
this, consider the example of IO 331411 (Primary smelting and refining of copper). This is the
manufacturing industry with the third lowest value of   (about 0.07), indicating that the
vast majority of its use is indirect to final-use production. That said, it is easy to trace production
chains of varying lengths which begin with 331411. An example of a short chain with just three
stages is: 331411 → 336500 (Railroad rolling stock) → F02000 (Private fixed investment), while a
much longer example with seven stages is: 331411 → 331420 (Copper rolling, drawing, extruding
and alloying) → 332720 (Turned product and screw, nut, and bolt) → 33291A (Valve and fittings
other than plumbing)→ 336300 (Motor vehicle parts)→ 336112 (Automobile)→ F01000 (Personal
consumption).22 To shed light on whether 331411’s use as an input is characterized by short as
opposed to long chains, we require a measure that distinguishes the indirect use value according to
the number of stages from final-use production at which that input use enters the value chain.
More specifically, referring back to the identity (26), let output for final use (the first term on
the right-hand side) be weighted by 1, let the input value used directly in final-use production (the
second term on the right-hand side) be weighted by 2, let the third term on the right-hand side be
weighted by 3, and so on. In matrix form, this boils down to calculating:
 + 2 + 32 + 43 +    = [ −]−2  . (28)
Although evaluating (28) would appear to require computing an infinite power series, this turns
out to be a simple function of the square of the Leontief inverse matrix. For each industry , we
then take the -th entry of [ −]−2  and normalize it by . Since larger weights are applied
the further upstream the input enters the production chain, this provides us with a measure of
upstreamness, which by construction is greater than or equal to 1. (The value exactly equals 1 if
and only if all the output of that industry goes to final use, and it is never used as an input by
other industries.) We therefore take the reciprocal to obtain  for each industry ,
21This entailed: (i) multiplying the ( )-th entry of  by ( − + − ), and (ii) multiplying the -th
entry of  by 1(−+−), where ,  and  denote respectively the value of exports, imports and net
changes in inventories reported for industry  in the Use Table. These are the adjustment terms implied by a natural
set of proportionality assumptions, namely that the shares of ’s output purchased by other industries  or for final
use in domestic transactions are respectively equal to the corresponding shares of ’s various uses both in net exports
and net changes in inventories.
22In identifying these production chains from the U.S. Input-Output Tables, we selected buying industries at each
stage which were among the top ten users by value of the input at that stage.
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where  now lies in the interval [0 1].
This second variable has several desirable properties that provide reassurance for its use as a
measure of production line position. In Antra`s et al. (2012), we established that the upstreamness
version of the variable is in fact equivalent to a recursively-defined measure of an industry’s distance
to final demand proposed independently by Fally (2012), where Fally’s construction hinges on the
idea that industries that purchase a lot of inputs from other upstream industries should themselves
be relatively upstream. The upstreamness variable can moreover be interpreted as a measure of
cost-push eﬀects or forward linkages — how much the output of all industries in the economy would
expand following a one dollar increase in value-added in the industry in question — highlighted
in the so-called supply-side branch of the input-output literature (for e.g., see Ghosh (1958), and
Miller and Blair (2009)).
We report in Table 1 the ten highest and lowest values of  and across
the IO2002 manufacturing industries. Not surprisingly, the industries that feature low downstream-
ness values tend to be in the processing of fuel, chemicals or metals, while industries with high values
appear to be goods that are near the retail end of the value chain. There is a reassuring degree of
agreement, with the two measures sharing seven out of the ten bottom industries and six out of the
top ten industries. While the correlation between   and  is clearly posi-
tive (with a Pearson coeﬃcient of 0.60), there are nevertheless useful distinctions between the two
measures. For example, Fertilizer (325310) is among the ten most upstream industries according
to , but it only ranks as the 35th most upstream manufacturing industry according
to   (with a value of 03086), indicating that a lot of its input value tends to enter early
in long production chains. On the other hand, Plastics and rubber industry machinery (333220)
is among the ten most upstream industries based on  , but actually ranks as the 183rd
most upstream according to  (with a value of 06785), consistent with the bulk of
its use occurring relatively close to final-good production.23
4.3 Empirical Specification
We now describe our empirical specifications for uncovering the eﬀect of production line position
on the share of intrafirm trade. As a baseline, we work with cross-industry regressions of the form:
 = 1 × 1(  ) + 2 × 1(  ) + 31(  ) +  +  +  + , (29)
The dependent variable, , is the U.S. intrafirm import share in industry  in a given year
. We seek to explain this as a function of the downstreamness, , of the industry in question,
as captured either by   or . Importantly, taking guidance from our
model, we seek to distinguish between the eﬀects of downstreamness in the sequential complements
and substitutes cases. We do this by interacting  with indicator variables, 1(  ) and
23We have further experimented with two other measures of downstreamness: (i) the final plus direct use value
divided by total output for that industry; and (ii) the final use value divided by total output for an industry. Our
results are reassuringly similar with both of these measures (results reported in Online Appendix Tables 3 and 4).
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1(  ), that equal one when the average demand elasticity faced by industries that purchase
 as an input is below (respectively above) the cross-industry median value of this variable.
Our theory in fact predicts that the sequential complements and substitutes cases would be
delineated by the conditions    and    respectively. While it would thus be ideal to
empirically capture the degree of technological substitutability across inputs within each industry
too, we are unfortunately constrained by the fact that estimates of cross-input substitutability are
not readily available in the literature, nor is it clear that these can be obtained from current data
sources.24 To make some progress, we therefore take the agnostic view that any existing cross-
sectoral variation in  is largely uncorrelated with the elasticity of demand, , faced by the average
buyer of an industry’s output, so that we can associate the sequential complements case with high
values of  and the substitutes case with low values of .
We construct this average buyer demand elasticity as follows. We used the U.S. import demand
elasticities estimated by Broda and Weinstein (2006) from disaggregate ten-digit Harmonized Sys-
tem (HS) product-level trade data. For each IO2002 industry, we then computed a demand elasticity
equal to the trade-weighted average elasticity of its constituent HS10 products, using data on U.S.
imports as weights. (Details on how this crosswalk between industry codes was implemented are
documented in the Data Appendix.) Next, we took a weighted average elasticity across industries
that purchase  as an input, with weights proportional to the value of input  used in the 2002 U.S.
Input-Output Tables. We included the final-use value of  in this last calculation by assigning it
the import demand elasticity of industry  itself. The average buyer demand elasticity that results
from these calculations is our empirical proxy for 1(1− ). In our baseline analysis, we split the
sample into industries with  above the industry median (sequential complements case) and below
the median (sequential substitutes case), with our model’s predictions leading us to expect that
1  0 and 2  0 in the estimating equation (29). We will later also report estimates that consider
finer cuts of this proxy for  by quintiles.
Equation (29) further includes an indicator variable to control for the level eﬀect of the sequential
complements case, a control vector of additional industry characteristics,  (including a constant
term), and year fixed eﬀects, . We cluster the standard errors by industry (as denoted by
the error term ), since the key explanatory variables related to downstreamness and the average
buyer demand elasticity vary only at the industry level, and these are being used to explain multiple
observations of the intrafirm trade share across years.
The vector  comprises a set of variables that have been identified previously as systematic
determinants of the propensity to transact within (multinational) firm boundaries, and which our
extensions in Section 3 suggest are important to incorporate as additional controls. First, we verify
whether measures of headquarter intensity are positively associated with the share of intrafirm
trade. This would be consistent with part (ii) of our statement of Proposition 4, but notice further
24For example, one might envision estimating  by exploiting time-series variation in the direct requirements
coeﬃcients, but comprehensive Input-Output Tables for the U.S. are constructed only every five years. Consequently,
it would be challenging to separately identify input substitutability from biased changes in production techniques
that might occur over extended periods of time.
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that part (i) of the Proposition also highlights that headquarter intensity can be expected to
aﬀect the condition that distinguishes the sequential complements and substitutes case, with 
being replaced by (1 − ). With that in mind, we will also experiment with specifications that
include triple interactions between downstreamness, the average buyer demand elasticity proxy, and
measures of headquarter intensity, as explained in more detail in the next section. As controls for
headquarter intensity, we include industry measures of physical capital per worker (as first suggested
by Antra`s, 2003) and skill intensity (nonproduction employees over total employment) derived from
the NBER-CES Database, as well as a measure of R&D intensity (R&D expenditures divided by
sales), computed by Nunn and Trefler (2011) from the Orbis database. In some specifications, we
further break down physical capital intensity into equipment capital intensity and plant capital
intensity. As pointed out by Nunn and Trefler (2011), capital equipment is much more likely to be
relationship-specific than plant structures, and thus we would expect the former to provide a cleaner
proxy for headquarter intensity. (We also follow Nunn and Trefler (2011) in including a materials
intensity variable, namely materials purchases per worker.) Last but not least, we control for a
measure of the within-industry size dispersion from Nunn and Trefler (2008). In light of Proposition
5, we expect this dispersion variable to have a positive eﬀect on the intrafirm import share. (Please
see the Data Appendix for more details on the construction of these control variables.)
We construct the above factor intensity and dispersion variables in a slightly diﬀerent way from
past papers. The standard practice to date has been to assign to industry  the value of the factor
intensity or size dispersion of  itself, namely the industry selling the good in question. A more
satisfactory approach that maps more directly into our present model would be to control for the
average value over industries that purchase good . We thus construct “average buyer” industry
versions of these variables by taking a weighted average of the characteristic values of industries
that purchase good  as an input, using weights derived from the 2002 U.S. Input-Output Tables,
in a manner analogous to our construction of the average buyer demand elasticity parameter, .
It turns out that using average buyer rather than seller industry variables makes little qualitative
diﬀerence to our results, but we adopt this approach because it is closer in spirit to the model.
(Summary statistics for all the variables can be found in Table 1 in the Online Appendix, while
their correlations with our two downstreamness measures are reported there in Table 2.)
As argued in Section 3.4, our model suggests that cross-country variation in the prevalence
of integration can be useful for addressing biases that might arise from the endogenous location
decisions of firms regarding diﬀerent stages of production. We will thus also explore specifications
that exploit the full country-industry variation in our intrafirm import share data, as follows:
 = 1×1(  )+2×1(  )+31(  )++++ , (30)
In words, this seeks to explain the intrafirm import share, , at the exporting country-industry-
year level as a function of a similar set of industry variables, while controlling for country-year fixed
eﬀects, , and (conservatively) clustering the standard errors by industry. Later on, we will build
on equation (30) to discuss tests that make use of this cross-country variation to address concerns
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related to the bias that might arise as a result of selection into exporting.
Before we turn to our results, it is worth acknowledging and discussing several caveats that
apply to our empirical strategy. To understand how the make-or-buy decision over an input is
related to that input’s location in a particular industry’s production line, one would ideally like to
observe the breakdown of intermediate input imports by the identity of the purchasing industry.
Unfortunately, such a level of detail is not available in the U.S. related party trade data. For
example, while we observe the share of U.S. intrafirm imports of rubber tires, we do not observe
a breakdown vis-a`-vis the intrafirm trade shares of rubber tires purchased by automobile versus
aircraft makers. We have instead pursued what is arguably the next best possible strategy, which
is to correlate the intrafirm trade share of industry  with measures of how far downstream  tends
to be used on average in production processes. The lack of detailed information at the level of the
purchasing industry also constrains our ability to empirically distinguish between the sequential
complements and substitutes cases, so that we have to rely instead on identifying sectors that sell
on average to industries that feature high versus low demand elasticities.
The U.S. Census Bureau trade data itself also comes with its limitations, as discussed at length
in Antra`s (2011). For example, the data do not report which party is owned by whom, namely
whether integration is backward or forward, in related party transactions. U.S. intrafirm imports
also generally underrepresent the true extent of U.S. multinational firms’ involvement in global
sourcing strategies, as we do not get to observe the cross-border shipment of parts and components
that takes place before goods are shipped back to the U.S. That said, it is less clear how (if at all) this
might systematically bias the empirical results we are about to discuss. On the plus side, it should
be emphasized that the U.S. Census Bureau subjects its related party trade data to several quality
assurance procedures. The data do oﬀer a complete picture of the sourcing strategies related to
transactions that cross U.S. customs, thus making it easier to spot fundamental factors that appear
to shape the internalization decisions over these transactions at the cross-industry level.
5 Empirical Results
5.1 Core Findings
We begin our empirical analysis in Table 2, by running shorter versions of the industry-year regres-
sions in (29) to replicate and refine some of the key findings from prior studies of the determinants of
intrafirm trade (for e.g., Antra`s (2003), Nunn and Trefler (2008, 2011), and Bernard et al. (2010)).
Toward this end, columns 1-3 serve to verify whether the characteristics of the “seller” industry
systematically explain the propensity to import the good within firm boundaries. In column 1, we
indeed find that two commonly-used measures of headquarter intensity — skill intensity (log())
and physical capital intensity (log()) — are both positively and significantly correlated with the
intrafirm import share. A third such proxy for the importance of headquarter services — R&D
intensity (log(0001 +&)) — displays a similarly strong positive association when added
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in column 2.25 Another measure based on factor use — the materials intensity — that one would
typically not associate with firm headquarters turns out indeed not to have predictive power for
the share of intrafirm trade. The last control added in column 2 is the measure of industry size
dispersion, which does have a positive and significant eﬀect on the propensity to trade within firm
boundaries, as found previously in Nunn and Trefler (2008). Column 3 further highlights the use-
fulness of distinguishing between equipment capital and plant structures (c.f., Nunn and Trefler
2011). The latter is more likely to involve noncontractible, relationship-specific investments by
firm headquarters, and thus it is not surprising that the plant capital intensity variable is weakly
correlated (actually, with a negative sign) with the share of intrafirm trade.
We repeat these regressions in columns 4-6, but now using the average buyer industry values of
the respective industry characteristics, in place of the typically-used “seller” industry values. As
we have argued earlier, it would be more consistent with our model of input sourcing to consider
industry characteristics that pertain to the input-purchasing industries. This has some eﬀects
on the estimates, although it is reassuring that the role of headquarter intensity still broadly
stands. Physical equipment capital and R&D intensity, in particular, continue to have positive and
statistically significant eﬀects on the intrafirm trade share. Note however that the eﬀects of skill
intensity and the size dispersion are now less significant than in columns 2 and 3.
The novel predictions from our model regarding the role of downstreamness are tested in Table
3 using the   measure of production line position. In column 1, this is introduced
directly as an additional explanatory variable in the industry-year regressions.26 When included
on its own, the eﬀect of   on the share of intrafirm trade turns out to be statistically
insignificant. Following the guidance of our theoretical model, we run our benchmark specification
from equation (29) in column 2, which includes the interactions of   with our proxies
for the sequential substitutes (  ) and complements (  ) cases, as well
as a dummy variable for the sequential complements case.27 The empirical results here are indeed
strongly supportive of our model’s central prediction: The eﬀect of downstreamness is positive
and significant at the 5% level when the average buyer demand elasticity is above the median
for this variable (2  0), consistent with a greater propensity towards the integration of input
suppliers that enter further downstream in the value chain. Conversely, the negative and significant
1 coeﬃcient confirms a greater propensity towards integrating upstream production stages in the
sequential substitutes case. Furthermore, the eﬀect of the (  ) dummy variable turns
out to be negative and statistically significant, which resonates with our comparative static result
in Proposition 3 on the eﬀect of . It is particularly reassuring that these new findings stand even
while including the same set of controls for average buyer headquarter intensity and dispersion
25We add 0.001 to the R&D expenditures over total sales ratio, in order to avoid dropping the industries with zero
reported R&D expenditures in the Orbis dataset.
26All our core results reported in Tables 3 and 4 remain very similar if the regressions are instead run year-by-year,
namely with the intrafirm trade share of industries in a particular year as the dependent variable, with Huber-White
robust standard errors (available on request).
27Note that there is no need to include the dummy variable for the sequential substitutes case, as the regressions
include a constant term.
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that were used earlier in Table 2. When we break the physical capital intensity variable down in
column 3 into its equipment and plant capital components, we in fact find that equipment intensity
and R&D intensity (two natural proxies for headquarter intensity) are positively and significantly
correlated with the intrafirm trade share, consistent with part (ii) of Proposition 4.
The next two columns of Table 3 verify that the eﬀects we have found in the pooled sample are
also present when we run our regressions separately on the subsets of industries where the average
buyer demand elasticity is below (respectively above) its median value. The eﬀect of  
is negative in the substitutes case (column 4) and positive in the complements case (column 5),
with both coeﬃcients of interest being significant at the 1% level. In column 6, we return to the
specification in (29) for the full sample of industries, though we now weight each data point by the
value of total imports for that industry-year. This is motivated by our earlier discussion in Section
4.1 on the possible measurement error introduced into the intrafirm trade share by the presence
of trade flows whose related party status was not reported to the U.S. Census Bureau, where we
also noted that this was likely to pose a greater concern for observations with small trade volumes
(see footnote 18 for some evidence). The weighting in column 6 thus attaches more weight to data
points that are likely associated with less measurement error. The results clearly reinforce our main
findings: The 2 coeﬃcient increases in magnitude, while remaining highly statistically significant.
Based on this point estimate, a one standard deviation increase in   would correspond
to an increase in the intrafirm trade share in high  industries of 0482 × 0228 = 0110, which
is over one-half of a standard deviation in the dependent variable, a fairly sizeable eﬀect. While
the 1 coeﬃcient for the substitutes case is now smaller, it remains negative and significant at the
10% level. A similar one standard deviation increase in   in this low  case would be
associated with a decrease in the intrafirm trade share of about one-fifth of a standard deviation.
Note too that the fit of the regression in terms of its 2 also improves markedly under weighted
least squares.28
We exploit the additional variation in the intrafirm import share across source countries in the
final two columns of Table 3. Following the specification in (30), column 7 includes country-year
fixed eﬀects and clusters the standard errors by industry. Column 8 in turn weights each observation
by the total import value for that country-industry-year, for reasons analogous to those discussed
above. The unweighted results in column 7 are relatively noisy, while also delivering a low R-
square. The negative eﬀect of downstreamness on integration remains evident in the substitutes
case, but that in the complements case is now imprecisely estimated (with an opposite sign to
that expected from our model).29 When working with the full country variation though, there
is arguably a stronger case for the weighted specification, as there are many more small import
flow observations and hence a greater scope for measurement error in the intrafirm trade share to
28One might be concerned that the largest manufacturing industry by import value, IO 336311 (Automobile), is
also the most downstream according to both   and , and that this might be driving the
significant findings in the weighted regressions. Our results remain qualitatively similar and significant when dropping
this industry, in both the cross-industry and the cross-industry, cross-country specifications (available on request).
29Note nevertheless that these point estimates are still consistent with the weaker prediction that downstreamness
should have a more negative eﬀect on integration in the substitutes than in the complements case.
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matter. These results in column 8 in fact look very similar to the purely cross-industry findings, with
the 2 coeﬃcient positive and significant at the 1% level, while 1 remains negative (although not
statistically significant). The remaining coeﬃcients are also consistent with the theory, with positive
eﬀects for our preferred headquarter intensity measures (equipment capital and R&D intensities),
and a negative eﬀect of the dummy variable for the sequential complements case.
In Table 4, we repeat the exercise from Table 3 using our second downstreamness variable,
, in place of  . This reassuringly corroborates our earlier findings on how
production line position influences integration outcomes, particularly in the complements case. We
consistently find a positive and significant eﬀect of  on the propensity to import
goods within firm boundaries in the high  case, both in the specifications that pool all industries
(columns 2, 3, 6) and when we focus on the subset of industries with above-median average buyer
demand elasticities (column 5). This eﬀect is especially strong when we weight observations by
import volumes: based on column 6, a one standard deviation increase in  would
imply a rise in the intrafirm import share of 0526 × 0222 = 0117, which is once again just over
half a standard deviation for our dependent variable. We likewise obtain a similar set of results
in column 8, which uses the country-industry-year data with weighted least squares. Admittedly,
the evidence in Table 4 is more mixed with regard to the role of  for industries that
fall under the substitutes case. The overall results do point towards a negative eﬀect, although the
point estimates are much smaller and not statistically distinguishable from zero.
We turn next to address potential criticisms regarding the use of a median cutoﬀ value for
the  proxy to distinguish between the sequential substitutes and complements cases. Given that
technological substitutability ( in our model) might well vary across sectors, it would be reasonable
to expect that the positive eﬀects of downstreamness would be concentrated in the highest ranges
of the elasticity demand parameter , while the negative eﬀects of downstreamness might only be
evident for particularly low values of . This leads us to consider a more flexible variant of (29)
that breaks down our empirical proxy for  by quintiles:
 =
5X
=1
1 × 1( ∈ Ω) +
5X
=2
21( ∈ Ω) +  +  +  +  (31)
Here, Ω refers to the subset corresponding to the -th quintile of  (for  = 1 2     5), with
1( ∈ Ω) being a dummy variable equal to 1 if industry  falls within this -th quintile.30 We
report three regressions in Table 5 for each of the downstreamness variables,   and
. For each measure, we estimate (31) both without and with regression weights
in the first and second columns respectively; the third column then runs the analogous weighted
specification with the country-industry-year data, while controlling for country-year fixed eﬀects.
(As before, all standard errors are clustered by industry, and all columns include the full set of
average buyer industry control variables used in columns 3, 6 and 8 in Tables 3 and 4.)
Table 5 confirms that the eﬀect of downstreamness on the intrafirm import share diﬀers qual-
30We drop the level eﬀect of the first quintile dummy as the regression already includes a constant term.
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itatively depending on the average buyer demand elasticity. The point estimates obtained on the
downstreamness variables in the lower (first and second) quintiles of the  proxy are negative
barring a few exceptions, even being significant at the 10% level in two of the   specifi-
cations. These coeﬃcients progressively increase as we move from the lowest quintile to the highest,
eventually becoming positive and statistically significant in all columns in the fifth quintile of , pre-
cisely for those industries most likely to fall under the sequential complements case. These results
therefore strengthen our confidence in the empirical relevance of our key theoretical predictions.
We further seek to allay concerns regarding omitted variables bias, specifically those arising from
other industry characteristics that could aﬀect the intrafirm trade share which we have not explicitly
controlled for so far. Toward this end, we revert to our cross-industry specification in equation (29)
and introduce several plausible controls; these results are reported in Table 6 for   and
in Table 7 for .31 We control for the value-added content of each industry — the ratio
of value-added to total shipments — in column 1. Column 2 examines whether the importance of a
good as an input in production processes might have an eﬀect on the propensity to trade that good
within firm boundaries. We capture this through a measure equal to the value of an industry’s total
use as an input, divided by the total input purchases made by all its buyer industries, constructed
from the U.S. Input-Output Tables.32 We incorporate the intermediation variable from Bernard
et al. (2010) in column 3, this being a measure of the extent to which wholesalers that serve as
intermediaries to transactions are observed to be active in a given industry. Finally, column 4
controls for proxies for industry contractibility, as suggested by Nunn and Trefler (2008). These
are based on the underlying share of products from an industry that are transacted on organized
exchanges or are reference-priced according to Rauch (1999), and which thus can be regarded as
homogeneous and readily contractible goods.33 We control here for both the own contractibility of
the good in question as well as an average contractibility taken over industries that purchase the
good, in order to distinguish between contracting frictions inherent to the seller and average buyer
industries respectively. (Further details on the construction of these additional variables can be
found in the Data Appendix.)
Our central finding on the contrasting eﬀects of downstreamness in the substitutes versus com-
plements case turn out to be remarkably robust. This is true when we introduce the aforementioned
additional industry variables either individually (columns 1-4) or jointly (column 5), as well as
when we run the regressions using total imports as weights (columns 6-10). Throughout Table 6,
  consistently has a negative correlation with the intrafirm trade share in the low  case,
31We have also run these same robustness checks on the full country-industry-year data, using the specification in
(30). These results are reported in Online Appendix Tables 5 and 6 respectively for   and ,
for the weighted least squares regressions. We consistently obtain results akin to our baselines: a positive and
significant eﬀect of downstreamness in the complements case, and a negative (albeit insignificant) eﬀect in the
substitutes case.
32The robustness results are very similar if we alternatively divide by the total gross output of buyer industries
when constructing this input “importance” variable (available on request).
33We report results using the liberal classification in Rauch (1999). The findings are very similar when using
his conservative classification, or when excluding reference-priced products from the definition of what constitutes a
contractible good (results available on request).
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with this coeﬃcient being significant at least at the 10% level except in columns 3 and 8 where we
control for the intermediation variable on its own. On the other hand, the positive correlation for
the high  case is always significant at the 5% level. We also obtain results similar to our baseline
regressions when using  instead in Table 7. Once again, we find that downstream-
ness is strongly associated with a higher intrafirm trade share in the complements case, although
the coeﬃcients for the substitutes case remain for the most part imprecisely estimated. (In Tables 6
and 7, we always control for the earlier set of average buyer factor intensity and dispersion variables
from column 3 of Tables 3 and 4. The coeﬃcients are not reported due to space constraints.)
Of independent interest, the intermediation variable always shows up with a negative and highly
significant coeﬃcient when included. This is consistent with Bernard et al. (2010), who interpret
the presence of wholesale intermediation as indicative of a reduced need to expand the boundaries
of the firm to secure the input in question. Separately, in the columns that control for the role
of contracting frictions, we generally find that inputs that are more contractible appear to be
transacted more within firm boundaries, while a greater degree of buyer industry contractibility is
associated with a reduced propensity towards integration, with these correlations being particularly
strong in the weighted specifications.34 In the case of , the negative coeﬃcient on
downstreamness in the substitutes case even becomes statistically significant in columns 9-10.35
5.2 Extensions
We round oﬀ our empirical analysis by testing several auxiliary implications from the extensions
that we developed in Sections 3.2-3.4, in order to explore how far the patterns in the data are
consistent with these additional predictions of our model of sequential production and sourcing.
Table 8 examines further the role of headquarter intensity. In Section 3.2, we showed that an
increase in  not only expands the range of stages that are vertically integrated, but also aﬀects
the range of parameter values for which downstreamness is predicted to have a positive eﬀect on
the share of intrafirm trade. In particular, recall from Proposition 4 that the complements and
substitutes cases are now defined by ˜ ≡ (1− )    and ˜   respectively, and thus the larger
is , the less likely it is that downstreamness will have a positive eﬀect on the intrafirm trade share,
even for large values of the buyer demand elasticity .
The findings from Table 8 uncover some evidence of this. The key diﬀerence relative to the
specifications in (29) and (30) is that we now include triple interactions, between ×1(  )
and  × 1(  ) on the one hand, and a set of five dummy variables corresponding to the
quintiles of a summary measure of headquarter intensity on the other. The latter is computed as the
first principal component of the three main industry measures of headquarter intensity that we have
34Incidentally, this dovetails with the predictions of the theoretical model in Antra`s and Helpman (2008) which
introduced a formulation of partial input contractibility; see in particular their Proposition 5.
35In regressions that use the additional source country dimension in the intrafirm import share, Nunn and Trefler
(2008) have further interacted the industry contractibility variables with a country index of the rule of law to get
a richer proxy for contracting frictions. We have done the same using the most updated version of the rule of law
index from Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2010), and verified that this does not aﬀect our main findings at all
(see column 5 in Online Appendix Tables 5 and 6).
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been using, namely the average buyer skill, equipment capital, and R&D intensities. We report three
specifications in Table 8 for each downstreamness measure, namely an unweighted cross-industry
regression, a weighted cross-industry regression, as well as a weighted cross-country, cross-industry
regression. (Throughout, we also control for all the buyer factor intensity and dispersion variables
from our baselines, as well as for the main and double interaction eﬀects of the terms in our triple
interactions.) As is clear from the table, the positive eﬀect of  × 1(  ) on the intrafirm
trade share is concentrated in the lowest quintile of headquarter intensity, with few systematic
patterns apparent for the other quintiles of our composite proxy for . There is some evidence too
that the negative eﬀect of  × 1(  ) is strongest in a relatively high (fourth) quintile of ;
the coeﬃcients in the fifth quintile are generally negative, though admittedly not significant.
We turn in Table 9 to an implication of the model that arises from incorporating firm heterogene-
ity in Section 3.3. As anticipated there, to the extent that the fixed costs of integration are relatively
high, only the most downstream of stages would be integrated in the sequential complements case,
with the converse prediction (integration of the most upstream stages) applying in the substitutes
case. We thus attempt to capture these predictions, by replacing our two main interaction terms in
(29) and (30) with quintiles of  interacted with each of 1(  ) and 1(  ).36 These
results are presented in Table 9, where the columns correspond to the same estimation procedures
used previously in Table 8 for   (columns 1-3) and  (columns 4-6). We
indeed find throughout all six columns that the positive eﬀect of downstreamness on the intrafirm
import share is concentrated in the highest quintile of  in the high  case. Moreover, in the low
 case, the propensity towards integration is strongest in the lowest quintile of . Table 9 thus
provides strong evidence consistent with this further prediction from our model.
The remaining table seeks to correct our cross-country, cross-industry regressions for potential
selection bias. As explained in Section 3.4, controlling for country fixed eﬀects may not be suﬃcient
for this purpose when the location of input production is itself aﬀected by the level of downstream-
ness. For this reason, we carry out a two-stage Heckman selection procedure in Table 10 that seeks
to correct for selection into foreign sourcing. In the context of our dataset, observations for which
no imports were observed entering the U.S. are necessarily dropped from our regression sample,
since the denominator of the intrafirm import share would equal zero in these cases. Any bias that
might arise would moreover be more salient in the specifications that incorporate the full cross-
country variation, since up to 60% of all potential country-industry-year observations are in fact
zero import flows, and hence are dropped. To address this, we adopt as selection variables (to be
included only in the first stage) an interaction term between an indicator for whether countries have
above sample-median entry costs (taken from the Doing Business dataset) and the selling industry’s
R&D intensity. This country measure of entry costs is specifically the first principal component
of the number of procedures, number of days, and the cost (as a percentage of income per capita)
incurred to legally start a local business. (Note however that a number of countries have to be
dropped due to the lack of entry cost data.) We in turn view the seller industry R&D variable as a
36We drop one of these interactions due to the collinearity with the constant term in the regressions.
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proxy for high fixed costs particularly at the entry stage.37 Following the logic of Helpman, Melitz
and Rubinstein (2008), the level of such country-industry entry costs can be expected to aﬀect the
entry decisions of firms, and thus to also be positively correlated with the fixed costs that would
be associated with expanding a firm to engage in export activities to the U.S. In contrast, these
entry costs are less likely to directly shape the intensive margin of trade.38
The estimation itself proceeds in two steps. We first run a probit model based on equation (30),
in which the dependent variable is a 0-1 variable indicating the presence of positive imports into
the U.S. for the country-industry-year observation in question. Our proposed interaction variable
indeed turns out to have a negative and significant eﬀect at the 1% level, so that higher entry costs
are ceteris paribus associated with a lower probability of importing to the U.S. (see column 1 for
  and column 4 for ). The second stage involves a weighted least squares
specification (using the total import volume as weights) based on (30) once again, in which the
inverse Mills ratio calculated from the first stage is included as a further regressor (columns 2 and
5). We once again obtain a positive and significant coeﬃcient on  in the sequential complements
case, as well as a negative but insignificant point estimate for the eﬀect in the substitutes case.
Relative to a weighted least squares specification that excludes the inverse Mills ratio (reported in
columns 3 and 6), we find that correcting for selection tends to have relatively little eﬀect on the
coeﬃcients of downstreamness in either the complements or the substitutes cases. This provides
reassurance that any such selection bias is unlikely to be driving our core results on the relationship
between downstreamness and integration decisions in foreign sourcing.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have developed a model of the organizational decisions of firms in which production
entails a continuum of sequential stages. We have shown that, for each stage, the firm’s make-or-
buy decision depends on that stage’s position in the value chain, and that dependence is crucially
shaped by the relative magnitude of the average buyer demand elasticity faced by the firm and
the degree of complementarity between inputs in production. When the average buyer demand
elasticity is high relative to input substitutability, stage inputs are sequential complements and
the firm finds it optimal to outsource relatively upstream stages and vertically integrate relatively
downstream stages. In the converse case of a low demand elasticity relative to input substitutability,
stage inputs are sequential substitutes and the firm instead finds it optimal to integrate relatively
upstream stages and outsource relatively downstream stages. We have shown that our framework
can be readily embedded into existing theoretical frameworks of global sourcing, which motivates
37In unreported results, we have also experimented with measures of industry scale economies calculated as the
employment per establishment, drawn from the U.S. Census Bureau’s County Business Patterns dataset. Our con-
clusions are largely unaﬀected with such alternative proxies of industry fixed costs.
38International tax considerations are often seen as another key factor that influences entry decisions by multi-
national firms. We have nevertheless verified that our results from specification (30) remain very similar when we
restrict our sample to countries whose eﬀective corporate tax rates for U.S. multinationals were within a 5% range
of that for these multinationals’ domestic U.S. activities, based on a 2011 PriceWaterhouseCoopers survey canvasing
U.S. firms entitled “Global Eﬀective Tax Rates”. We thank Brent Neiman for bringing this survey to our attention.
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our use of international trade data to test the model. Using data on U.S. related-party trade shares,
we have shown that the evidence is broadly consistent with the model’s main predictions, as well
as with several auxiliary predictions of our framework.
Although our empirical results are suggestive of the empirical relevance of our theory, we ac-
knowledge the existence of a tension between our “firm-level” theoretical model and our “industry-
level” empirical analysis. We are limited, however, by the data that is currently available to
researchers in our field. We can only hope that in the near future new firm-level datasets featuring
detailed information on the sourcing decisions of firms for diﬀerent inputs will become available.
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A Mathematical Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: The result follows from studying how the ratio in the expression for ∗ () in
(13) depends on . When   , it is clear that the numerator is decreasing in , while the denominator
is increasing in . Due to the negative sign in front of the ratio, it follows that ∗ () is increasing in 
whenever ∗ ()  0. The case    is more cumbersome. It proves useful to re-write ∗ () as:
∗ ()− (1− )
−
1−
=
⎛
⎝
Z 1

()(1− ()) 1−
∙Z 
0
(1− ()) 1− 
¸ −(1−)−1

⎞
⎠
∙Z 
0
(1− ()) 1− 
¸ −(1−)
.
(32)
Straightforward diﬀerentiation shows that the sign of the derivative of the right-hand side of this expression
with respect to  is determined by that of:
−() + − (1− )
⎛
⎝
Z 1

()(1− ()) 1−
∙Z 
0
(1− ()) 1− 
¸ −(1−)−1

⎞
⎠
∙Z 
0
(1− ()) 1− 
¸ −(1−)
which using the expression in (32) for ∗ () simplifies to:
−1−  (1− 
∗ ()) ≤ 0,
and thus ∗ () is decreasing in  when   . Note that we do not allow the firm to set ∗ ()  1, but
in the proof of Proposition 2 below, we will verify that the firm never has an incentive to do so.
Proof of Proposition 2: We begin by examining the limiting values of ∗ (). When  → 1, the
numerator of the last ratio in the expression for ∗ () in (13) goes to 0, while the denominator converges to
a positive finite value, implying lim→1 ∗ (1) = 1−. The limit as → 0 is more complicated to compute.
First, take the case of   . When → 0, the numerator of the last ratio in the expression for ∗ () in
(13) converges to a positive finite value, while the denominator goes to 0. Because this ratio enters with a
negative sign, we thus have lim→0 ∗ () = 0 (remember that ∗ () ≥ 0). For the case   , we again
appeal to the alternative formula for ∗ () in (32). Note that
lim→0
(
∗ ()− (1− )
−
1−
)
= lim→0
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
R 1
 ()(1− ())

1−
hR 
0
(1− ()) 1− 
i −(1−)−1 £R
0
(1− ()) 1− ¤ −(1−)
⎫
⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎭
As → 0, the limits of the numerator and denominator on the right-hand side of the above expression both
tend to +∞, so we need to use l’Hoˆpital’s rule:
lim→0
(
∗ ()− (1− )
−
1−
)
= lim→0
⎧
⎨
⎩
−() (1− ()) 1− £R
0
(1− ()) 1− ¤ −(1−)−1
−
(1−)
£R
0
(1− ()) 1− ¤ −(1−)−1 (1− ()) 1−
⎫
⎬
⎭ ,
which simplifies to
∗ (0)− (1− )
−
1−
=
∗ (0)
−
(1−)
,
from which we obtain ∗ (0) = 1.
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Together with Lemma 1, the above limit values imply that when   , it is optimal for the firm to choose
 (namely outsourcing) for stages with a small index in the neighborhood of  = 0, since 0     .
Conversely, in the    case, it is optimal for the firm to choose  (namely integration) for stages in a
neighborhood of  = 0.
To fully establish Proposition 2 for the case   , we proceed to show that we cannot have a positive
measure of integrated stages located upstream relative to a positive measure of outsourced stages in the
optimal organizational structure. Since the limit values above indicate that stage 0 will be outsourced, it
follows that if any stages are to be integrated, they have to be downstream relative to all outsourced stages.
In other words, there exists an optimal cutoﬀ ∗ ∈ (0 1] such that all stages in [0∗) are outsourced and
stages in [∗  1] are integrated. (If ∗ = 1, then all stages along the production line are outsourced.)
We establish the above claim by contradiction. Suppose that there exists a stage ˜ ∈ (0 1) and a positive
constant   0 such that stages in (˜−  ˜) are integrated, while stages in (˜ ˜+ ) are outsourced. The
width of both of these sub-intervals, , can clearly be chosen to be equal without loss of generality. Let profits
from this mode of organization be Π1. On the other hand, consider an alternative organizational mode which
instead outsources the stages in (˜−  ˜) and integrates the stages in (˜ ˜+ ), while retaining the same
organizational decision for all other stages. Let profits from this alternative be Π2. Using the expression for
the firm’s profits from (11), one can show that up to a positive multiplicative constant:
Π1 −Π2 ∝
Z ˜
˜−
 (1−  ) 1−
£ + ( − ˜+ )(1−  ) 1− ¤ −(1−) 
+
Z ˜+
˜
(1− ) 1−
£ + (1−  ) 1− + ( − ˜)(1− ) 1− ¤ −(1−) 
−
Z ˜
˜−
(1− ) 1−
£ + ( − ˜+ )(1− ) 1− ¤ −(1−) 
−
Z ˜+
˜
 (1−  ) 1−
£ + (1− ) 1− + ( − ˜)(1−  ) 1− ¤ −(1−) .
where we define  ≡ R ˜−
0
(1 − ()) 1− . That the diﬀerence in profits depends only on profits in the
interval (˜− ˜+) and is not aﬀected by decisions downstream follows from the fact that we have chosen
the width  to be common for both sub-intervals. Evaluating the integrals above with respect to  and
simplifying, we obtain after some tedious algebra:
Π1 −Π2 ∝ ( − )
∙¡ + (1−  ) 1− ¢ (1−)(1−) + ¡ + (1− ) 1− ¢ (1−)(1−)
− ¡ + (1−  ) 1− + (1− ) 1− ¢ (1−)(1−) − (1−)(1−) ¸ 
Since  −   0, it suﬃces to show that the expression in square parentheses is negative. To see
this, consider the function () =  (1−)(1−) . Simple diﬀerentiation will show that for    0 and  ≥ 0,
(+ + )− ( + ) is an increasing function in  when   . Hence, ( + + ) (1−)(1−) − ( + ) (1−)(1−) 
( + ) (1−)(1−) − () (1−)(1−) . Setting  = ,  = (1 − ) 1− and  = (1 −  ) 1− , it follows that the last
term in square brackets is negative and that Π1 − Π2  0. This yields the desired contradiction as profits
can be strictly increased by switching to the organizational mode that yields profits Π2.
The full proof for the    case can be established using an analogous proof by contradiction. The
limit values in this case imply that it is optimal to integrate stage 0. One can then show that if any stages
are to be outsourced, they occur downstream to all the integrated stages, so that there is a unique cutoﬀ
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∗ ∈ (0 1) with all stages prior to ∗ being integrated and all stages after ∗ being outsourced.
Proof of Proposition 3: We begin by deriving equations (14) and (15). For each case, this is achieved
by first plugging the optimal values of () ∈ {  } for all  ∈ [0 1] implied by Proposition 2 into the
firm’s maximand in (11), and then solving
∗ = argmax
½
(1− )

1−
Z 
0
 −(1−)  +  (1−  ) 1−
Z 1

£
(1− ) 1−+ (1−  ) 1− ( −)
¤ −(1−) ¾ ;
∗ = argmax
½
 (1−  )

1−
Z 
0
 −(1−)  + (1− ) 1−
Z 1

£
(1−  ) 1−+ (1− ) 1− ( −)
¤ −(1−) ¾ .
Let us illustrate the solution for this in the case   . The first-order condition associated with the
optimal choice of  is given by:
(1− )

1− −(1−) −  (1−  ) 1− (1− )
−
(1−)(1−) −(1−)
+  (1−  ) 1− − (1− )
¡
(1− ) 1− − (1−  ) 1−
¢ Z 1

£
(1− ) 1−+ (1−  ) 1− ( −)
¤ −(1−)−1  = 0
which after a few simplifications can be written as
 −  = 
Ã
1−
µ
1− 
1− 
¶ 
1−
!⎛
⎝
"
1 +
µ
1− 
1− 
¶ 
1− µ1−

¶# −(1−)⎞
⎠ 
from which the formula for∗ in (14) is obtained. (One can moreover verify that the second-order condition
when evaluated at∗ is indeed negative.) The formula for∗ in (15) can be derived in an analogous manner.
Using the expression in (14), one can show that ∗  1 when  (1− )(1−)  (1− )(1−).
Moreover, when this inequality is satisfied, one can readily check that 1−   1−
³
1−
1−
´−(1−)
, which
from (14) implies that ∗  0, so that the cutoﬀ stage lies strictly in the interior of (0 1). Conversely, using
(15) for the substitutes case, we have that ∗  1 whenever  (1−  )(1−)  (1− )(1−), and
that this condition is also suﬃcient to ensure that ∗  0, so that ∗ ∈ (0 1).
Next, consider the eﬀect of  on these thresholds. For∗ , the exponent (1−)− is positive and decreasing
in . Moreover, when the parameter restrictions for ∗ ∈ (0 1) apply, the fraction that is the base of this
exponent is strictly greater than 1. It thus follows that ∗  0, as claimed in the Proposition, namely
that when  falls, ∗ also falls, expanding the range of stages downstream of ∗ that are integrated. An
analogous set of arguments can be applied to show that ∗  0.
Proof of Proposition 4: From the discussion in Section 3.2 and equation (10), we have that investments
by suppliers in this extension with headquarter intensity will be given by:
() =
µ
1− ˜
µ

¶
(1− )−˜
¶ 1
1−˜ µ 1− ˜
1− 
¶ ˜−(1−˜)
(1− ()) 11−
∙Z 
0
(1− ()) 1− 
¸ ˜−(1−˜)
,
where remember that ˜ ≡ (1− ) .
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It follows from equation (11) that the final good producer will capture revenues given by
 =
Ã
1−
µ ˜

¶˜µ

¶
(1− )−˜
! 1
1−˜ ˜

µ
1− ˜
1− 
¶ ˜−(1−˜) Z 1
0
()(1−()) 1−
∙Z 
0
(1− ()) 1− 
¸ ˜−(1−˜)

(33)
Before suppliers make any investments, the firm will choose  to maximize  − . From equation
(33), it is clear that this optimal choice of will satisfy

1− ˜ = ,
and thus the firm obtains profits equal to  =
³
1−
1−˜
´
 . One can then substitute the optimal value of 
from the above first-order condition back into the expression for  in (33), to solve for  as a function of
the model parameters and the organizational decisions (the ()’s) only. From this, it will be straightforward
to see that the sequence of organizational forms that maximizes profits will be that which maximizes
Z 1
0
()(1− ()) 1−
∙Z 
0
(1− ()) 1− 
¸ ˜−(1−˜)
,
but this is precisely analogous to the objective function in the Benchmark Model, except with  replaced by
˜. This establishes part (i) of Proposition 4.
For part (ii) of the proposition, the cutoﬀ expressions for the two cases, ∗ and ∗ , are now given
by (14) and (15) respectively, with  replaced by ˜. Diﬀerentiating (14) and (15) with respect to  (as in
Proposition 3) and bearing in mind that ˜ is decreasing in , yields the desired comparative static results.
Proof of Proposition 5: A firm with productivity parameter  now chooses its organizational structure
along the value chain to maximize
 = 
µ
1− 
1− 
¶ −(1−) µ

¶ 
1− Z 1
0
()(1− ()) 1−
∙Z 
0
(1− ()) 1− 
¸ −(1−)
 −
Z 1
0
 () ,
where (() ()) = (   ) when stage  is integrated and (() ()) = ( ) when it is out-
sourced. It should be clear that the choice of a (hypothetical) unconstrained optimal division of surplus
∗ () for stage  is not aﬀected by the fixed costs terms, since these do not impact the derivative and the
fixed costs are independent of the stage of production being considered.
For the complements case, we thus have
∗ = argmax
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
 1−
n
(1− )

1−
R
0
 −(1−)  +
 (1−  ) 1−
R 1

£
(1− ) 1−+ (1−  ) 1− ( −)
¤ −(1−) ¾− − (1−) 
⎫
⎪⎬
⎪⎭
where recall that  =  
³
1−
1−
´ −(1−) ¡

¢ 
1− . Solving this in a manner analogous to the proof of Proposition
3 delivers equation (22). The rest of the proof follows from the discussion in Section 3.3.
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B Data Appendix
Intrafirm trade: From the U.S. Census Bureau’s Related Party Trade Database, for the years 2000-2010.
The data in NAICS industry codes were mapped to six-digit IO2002 industry codes using the correspondence
provided by the Bureau Economic Analysis (BEA) as a supplement to the 2002 U.S. Input-Output (I-O)
Tables. This is a straightforward many-to-one mapping for the manufacturing industries (NAICS first digit
= 3). Two industries required a separate treatment as the Census Bureau data was at a coarser level of
aggregation than could be mapped into six-digit IO2002 codes: A synthetic code 31131X was created to
merge IO 311313 (Beet sugar manufacturing) and 31131A (Sugar cane mills and refining), while a separate
code 33641X merged IO 336311, 336412, 336413, 336414, 33641A (all related to the manufacture of aircraft
and related components). All other industry variables described below were also constructed for these two
synthetic IO2002 codes. After converting the related party and non-related party import data to the IO2002
codes, the share of intrafirm imports was calculated for each industry-year or country-industry-year as:
(Related Trade)/(Related Trade + Non-Related Trade).
DUse TUse: Calculated from the 2002 U.S. I-O Tables, as described in Section 4B, using the detailed
Supplementary Use Table after redefinitions issued by the BEA. For the synthetic codes 33131X and 33641X,
we took a weighted average of the   values of the component IO2002 industries, using the output
of these component industries as weights.
DownMeasure: Calculated from the 2002 U.S. I-O Tables, as described in Section 4B. In particular,
 is the reciprocal of the upstreamness measure discussed in detail in Antra`s et al. (2012). For
the synthetic codes 33131X and 33641X, we took a weighted average of the  values of the
component IO2002 industries, using the output of these component industries as weights.
Import demand elasticities: U.S. import demand elasticities for HS10 products were from Broda
and Weinstein (2006). This was merged with a comprehensive list of HS10 codes from Pierce and Schott
(2009). For each HS10 code missing an elasticity value, we assigned a value equal to the trade-weighted
average elasticity of the available HS10 codes with which it shared the same first nine digits. This was done
successively up to codes that shared the same first two digits, to fill in as many HS10 elasticities as possible.
Using the IO-HS concordance provided by the BEA with the 2002 U.S. I-O Tables, we then took the trade-
weighted average of the HS10 elasticities within each IO2002 category. At each stage, the weights used were
the total value of U.S. imports by HS10 code from 1989-2006, calculated from Feenstra et al. (2002). There
remained 13 IO2002 industries without elasticity values after the above procedure. For these, we assigned a
value equal to the weighted average elasticity of the IO2002 codes with which the industry shared the same
first four digits, or (if the value was still missing) the same first three digits, using industry output values
as weights. This yielded import elasticities for the seller industry (that sells the input in question). For the
average buyer elasticity, we took a weighted average of the elasticities of industries that purchase the input
in question, with weights equal to these input purchase values as reported in the 2002 U.S. I-O Tables.
Factor intensities: From the NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry Database (Becker and Gray, 2009).
Skill intensity is the log of the number of non-production workers divided by total employment. Physical
capital intensity is the log of the real capital stock per worker. Equipment capital intensity and plant capital
intensity are respectively the log of the equipment and plant capital stock per worker. Materials intensity
is the log of materials purchases per worker. The NBER-CES data for NAICS industries were mapped to
IO2002 codes using the procedure described above for the related party trade data. For each factor intensity
variable, a simple average of the annual values from 2000-2005 was taken to obtain the seller industry
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measures. The factor intensities for the average buyer were then calculated using the same procedure as
described for the average buyer import demand elasticity.
R&D intensity: From Nunn and Trefler (2011), who calculated R&D expenditures to total sales on
an annual basis for IO1997 industries using the U.S. firms in the Orbis dataset. We constructed a crosswalk
from IO1997 to IO2002 through the NAICS industry codes. The R&D intensity for each IO2002 industry
was then calculated as the weighted average value of log(0001 + &) over that of its constituent
IO1997 industries over the years 2000-2005, using the industry output values in the 1997 U.S. I-O Tables as
weights. A similar procedure to that described above for the import demand elasticity was used to obtain
the R&D intensity for the remaining 13 IO2002 codes. The R&D intensity for the average buyer was then
calculated using the same procedure as described for the average buyer import demand elasticity.
Dispersion: From Nunn and Trefler (2008), who constructed dispersion for each HS6 code as the
standard deviation of log exports for its HS10 sub-codes across U.S. port locations and destination countries
in the year 2000, from U.S. Department of Commerce data. We associated the dispersion value of each HS6
code to each of its HS10 sub-codes. These were mapped into IO2002 industries using the IO-HS concordance,
taking a trade-weighted average of the dispersion value over HS10 constituent codes; the weights used were
the total value of U.S. imports for each HS10 code from 1989-2006, from Feenstra et al. (2002). A similar
procedure to that described above for the import demand elasticity was used to obtain the dispersion measure
for the remaining 13 IO2002 codes. The dispersion for the average buyer was then calculated using the same
procedure described for the average buyer import demand elasticity.
Other industry controls: Value-added over the value of shipments was calculated from the NBER-CES
Manufacturing Industry Database, as described for the factor intensity variables; an average over 2000-2005
was used. Input “importance” was computed from the 2002 U.S. I-O Tables, as the industry’s total use
value as an input divided by the total input purchases made by all of its buyer industries.
Contractibility was computed from the 2002 U.S. I-O Tables, following the methodology of Nunn (2007).
For each IO2002 industry, we first calculated the fraction of HS10 constituent codes classified by Rauch (1999)
as neither reference-priced nor traded on an organized exchange, under Rauch’s “liberal” classification. (The
original Rauch classification was for SITC Rev. 2 products; these were associated with HS10 codes using a
mapping derived from U.S. imports in Feenstra et al. (2002).) We took one minus this value as a measure
of the own contractibility of each IO2002 industry. The average buyer contractibility was then calculated
using the same procedure described for computing the average buyer import demand elasticity.
Intermediation was from Bernard et al. (2010), who calculated this from U.S. establishment-level data
as the weighted average of the wholesale employment share of firms in 1997, using the import share of each
firm as weights. This variable was reported at the HS2 level in the NBER long version of their paper. We
associated the intermediation value for each HS2 code to each of its HS10 sub-codes. These were mapped
into IO2002 industries using the IO-HS concordance, taking a trade-weighted average of the intermediation
value over HS2 constituent codes; the weights used were the total value of U.S. imports for each HS10 code
from 1989-2006, from Feenstra et al. (2002). A similar procedure to that described above for the import
demand elasticity was used to obtain the intermediation measure for the remaining 13 IO2002 codes.
Country variables: Country entry costs were taken from the Doing Business dataset. Data on the
number of procedures, number of days, and cost (as a percentage of income per capita) required to start a
business were used. These were averaged over 2003-2005 for each variable. Country rule of law was from the
Worldwide Governance Indicators (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2010). The annual index was linearly
rescaled from its original range of −25 to 2.5, to lie between 0 and 1.
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IO2002 Industry DUse_TUse IO2002 Industry DownMeasure
331314 Secondary smelting and alloying of aluminum 0.0000 325110 Petrochemical 0.2150
325110 Petrochemical 0.0599 331411 Primary smelting and refining of copper 0.2296
331411 Primary smelting and refining of copper 0.0741 331314 Secondary smelting and alloying of aluminum 0.2461
325211 Plastics material and resin 0.1205 325190 Other basic organic chemical 0.2595
325910 Printing ink 0.1325 33131A Alumina refining and primary aluminum 0.2622
311119 Other animal food 0.1385 325310 Fertilizer 0.2658
333220 Plastics and rubber industry machinery 0.1420 335991 Carbon and graphite product 0.2668
33131A Alumina refining and primary aluminum 0.1447 325181 Alkalies and chlorine 0.2769
335991 Carbon and graphite product 0.1615 331420 Copper rolling, drawing, extruding, and alloying 0.2769
331420 Copper rolling, drawing, extruding, and alloying 0.1804 325211 Plastics material and resin 0.2800
334517 Irradiation apparatus 0.9669 339930 Doll, Toy, and Game 0.9705
339930 Doll, Toy, and Game 0.9686 311111 Dog and cat food 0.9717
337910 Mattress 0.9779 337910 Mattress 0.9720
322291 Sanitary paper product 0.9790 315230 Women's and girl's cut and sew apparel 0.9762
337121 Upholstered household furniture 0.9864 321991 Manufactured home (mobile home) 0.9810
337212 Office furniture and custom woodwork & millwork 0.9868 336212 Truck trailer 0.9837
336213 Motor home 0.9879 336213 Motor home 0.9879
33299A Ammunition 0.9956 316200 Footwear 0.9927
316200 Footwear 0.9967 337121 Upholstered household furniture 0.9928
336111 Automobile 0.9997 336111 Automobile 0.9997
Notes: Tabulated based on the set of 253 IO2002 manufacturing industries for which data on intrafirm import shares was available. 
Highest 10 values
Tail Values of Industry Measures of Production Line Position (Downstreamness)
Table 1
Lowest 10 valuesLowest 10 values
Highest 10 values
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log (s/l) 0.200*** 0.109*** 0.117*** 0.143*** 0.004 0.019
[0.031] [0.038] [0.037] [0.039] [0.043] [0.043]
Log (k/l) 0.068*** 0.037* 0.096*** 0.047
[0.014] [0.021] [0.018] [0.028]
   Log (equipment k / l) 0.070*** 0.083**
[0.024] [0.033]
   Log (plant k / l) -0.051 -0.063
[0.032] [0.045]
Log (materials/l) 0.018 0.023 0.056 0.063*
[0.026] [0.026] [0.035] [0.035]
Log (0.001+ R&D/Sales) 0.029*** 0.030*** 0.055*** 0.054***
[0.007] [0.006] [0.009] [0.009]
Dispersion 0.130** 0.150** 0.083 0.120
[0.063] [0.061] [0.070] [0.075]
Industry controls for: Seller Seller Seller Buyer Buyer Buyer
Year fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2783 2783 2783 2783 2783 2783
R-squared 0.23 0.30 0.31 0.17 0.27 0.28
Table 2
Baseline Determinants of the Intrafirm Import Share
Notes: ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. Standard errors are clustered by industry. All 
columns use industry-year observations controlling for year fixed effects. Estimation is by OLS. Industry factor intensity and dispersion 
variables in Columns 1-3 are that of the seller industry (namely, the industry that sells the input in question), while in Columns 4-6, 
these variables are a weighted average of the characteristics of buyer industries (the industries that buy the input in question).
Dependent variable:   Intrafirm Import Share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Elas < Median Elas >= Median Weighted Weighted
Log (s/l) 0.005 0.039 0.056 0.112* 0.038 -0.098 0.005 -0.068
[0.044] [0.043] [0.042] [0.064] [0.055] [0.079] [0.020] [0.076]
Log (k/l) 0.044 0.034
[0.029] [0.027]
   Log (equipment k / l) 0.085** 0.022 0.153*** 0.188*** 0.026 0.134***
[0.034] [0.047] [0.043] [0.061] [0.016] [0.051]
   Log (plant k / l) -0.077* -0.011 -0.159** -0.151** -0.056*** -0.142***
[0.045] [0.057] [0.064] [0.070] [0.019] [0.050]
Log (materials/l) 0.058* 0.060* 0.065* 0.049 0.072 0.060 0.025* 0.080
[0.035] [0.034] [0.033] [0.049] [0.047] [0.058] [0.014] [0.049]
Log (0.001+ R&D/Sales) 0.055*** 0.054*** 0.053*** 0.050*** 0.054*** 0.090*** 0.031*** 0.073***
[0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.013] [0.013] [0.018] [0.004] [0.016]
Dispersion 0.081 0.061 0.103 0.034 0.188* 0.160 0.108*** 0.083
[0.070] [0.070] [0.075] [0.108] [0.100] [0.124] [0.038] [0.108]
DUse_TUse -0.018 -0.216*** 0.225***
[0.054] [0.075] [0.069]
DUse_TUse X 1(Elas < Median) -0.196*** -0.174** -0.166* -0.115*** -0.075
[0.071] [0.072] [0.089] [0.033] [0.073]
DUse_TUse X 1(Elas > Median) 0.171** 0.198*** 0.482*** -0.035 0.352***
[0.067] [0.068] [0.123] [0.030] [0.118]
1(Elas > Median) -0.191*** -0.191*** -0.410*** -0.049* -0.291***
[0.062] [0.061] [0.085] [0.029] [0.075]
Industry controls for: Buyer Buyer Buyer Buyer Buyer Buyer Buyer Buyer
Year fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Country-Year fixed effects? No No No No No No Yes Yes
Observations 2783 2783 2783 1375 1408 2783 207991 207991
R-squared 0.27 0.32 0.33 0.37 0.28 0.61 0.18 0.59
Table 3
Downstreamness and the Intrafirm Import Share: DUse_TUse
Dependent variable:   Intrafirm Import Share
Notes: ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. Standard errors are clustered by industry. Columns 1-6 use industry-year observations 
controlling for year fixed effects, while Columns 7-8 use country-industry-year observations controlling for country-year fixed effects. Estimation is by OLS. In all columns, the 
industry factor intensity and dispersion variables are a weighted average of the characteristics of buyer industries (the industries that buy the input in question). Columns 4 and 5 
restrict the sample to observations where the buyer industry elasticity is smaller (respectively larger) than the industry median value. "Weighted" columns use the value of total 
imports for the industry-year or country-industry-year respectively as regression weights.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Elas < Median Elas >= Median Weighted Weighted
Log (s/l) -0.011 0.019 0.037 0.088 0.032 -0.143** 0.000 -0.097*
[0.045] [0.042] [0.041] [0.067] [0.051] [0.058] [0.020] [0.054]
Log (k/l) 0.062** 0.058**
[0.027] [0.026]
   Log (equipment k / l) 0.125*** 0.061 0.192*** 0.157** 0.039** 0.139***
[0.036] [0.047] [0.048] [0.066] [0.017] [0.047]
   Log (plant k / l) -0.100** -0.027 -0.192*** -0.091 -0.062*** -0.117**
[0.049] [0.061] [0.073] [0.080] [0.020] [0.052]
Log (materials/l) 0.050 0.043 0.049 0.022 0.064 0.032 0.017 0.046
[0.033] [0.033] [0.032] [0.050] [0.043] [0.055] [0.014] [0.043]
Log (0.001+ R&D/Sales) 0.058*** 0.054*** 0.054*** 0.053*** 0.050*** 0.089*** 0.032*** 0.072***
[0.010] [0.009] [0.009] [0.014] [0.014] [0.017] [0.004] [0.014]
Dispersion 0.087 0.092 0.150* 0.082 0.258** 0.249* 0.116*** 0.163
[0.072] [0.076] [0.079] [0.114] [0.105] [0.147] [0.043] [0.114]
DownMeasure 0.101* -0.036 0.342***
[0.055] [0.069] [0.081]
DownMeasure X 1(Elas < Median) -0.024 0.025 -0.119 -0.002 -0.002
[0.064] [0.065] [0.107] [0.035] [0.091]
DownMeasure X 1(Elas > Median) 0.249*** 0.298*** 0.526*** -0.039 0.440***
[0.085] [0.081] [0.100] [0.033] [0.089]
1(Elas > Median) -0.115* -0.110* -0.386*** 0.022 -0.279***
[0.064] [0.062] [0.081] [0.030] [0.072]
Industry controls for: Buyer Buyer Buyer Buyer Buyer Buyer Buyer Buyer
Year fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Country-Year fixed effects? No No No No No No Yes Yes
Observations 2783 2783 2783 1375 1408 2783 207991 207991
R-squared 0.28 0.31 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.64 0.18 0.61
Table 4
Downstreamness and the Intrafirm Import Share: DownMeasure
Dependent variable:   Intrafirm Import Share
Notes: ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. Standard errors are clustered by industry. Columns 1-6 use industry-year observations 
controlling for year fixed effects, while Columns 7-8 use country-industry-year observations controlling for country-year fixed effects. Estimation is by OLS. In all columns, the 
industry factor intensity and dispersion variables are a weighted average of the characteristics of buyer industries (the industries that buy the input in question). Columns 4 and 5 
restrict the sample to observations where the buyer industry elasticity is smaller (respectively larger) than the industry median value. "Weighted" columns use the value of total 
imports for the industry-year or country-industry-year respectively as regression weights.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Downstreamness: DUse_TUse DUse_TUse DUse_TUse DownMeasure DownMeasure DownMeasure
Weighted Weighted Weighted Weighted
Log (s/l) 0.042 -0.028 -0.015 0.031 -0.121** -0.089**
[0.042] [0.073] [0.068] [0.042] [0.055] [0.042]
   Log (equipment k / l) 0.083** 0.129** 0.080* 0.118*** 0.070 0.062
[0.034] [0.060] [0.048] [0.036] [0.060] [0.046]
   Log (plant k / l) -0.069 -0.108* -0.103** -0.094** -0.027 -0.058
[0.044] [0.063] [0.041] [0.047] [0.059] [0.037]
Log (materials/l) 0.072** 0.078 0.099** 0.061* 0.063 0.078*
[0.035] [0.054] [0.046] [0.034] [0.051] [0.042]
Log (0.001+ R&D/Sales) 0.054*** 0.076*** 0.062*** 0.054*** 0.081*** 0.067***
[0.009] [0.016] [0.014] [0.009] [0.016] [0.013]
Dispersion 0.107 0.073 0.003 0.156** 0.187 0.108
[0.072] [0.113] [0.101] [0.075] [0.125] [0.094]
Downstream X 1(Elas Quintile 1) -0.165* -0.252* -0.138 0.049 -0.283 -0.089
[0.093] [0.148] [0.100] [0.119] [0.202] [0.142]
Downstream X 1(Elas Quintile 2) -0.173 -0.100 -0.037 -0.042 -0.154 -0.040
[0.108] [0.136] [0.115] [0.099] [0.139] [0.122]
Downstream X 1(Elas Quintile 3) -0.145 0.008 0.051 0.019 0.114 0.224
[0.130] [0.166] [0.153] [0.124] [0.166] [0.172]
Downstream X 1(Elas Quintile 4) 0.215** 0.159 0.066 0.332*** 0.066 0.073
[0.100] [0.142] [0.119] [0.126] [0.174] [0.120]
Downstream X 1(Elas Quintile 5) 0.198* 0.781*** 0.637*** 0.312** 0.736*** 0.621***
[0.103] [0.194] [0.199] [0.130] [0.110] [0.096]
Industry controls for: Buyer Buyer Buyer Buyer Buyer Buyer
Elas Quintile dummies? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Country-Year fixed effects No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 2783 2783 207991 2783 2783 207991
R-squared 0.34 0.64 0.61 0.34 0.67 0.62
Table 5
Effect of Downstreamness: By Import Elasticity Quintiles
Dependent variable:   Intrafirm Import Share
Notes: ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. Standard errors are clustered by industry. Columns 1-2 and 4-5 use 
industry-year observations controlling for year fixed effects, while Columns 3 and 6 use country-industry-year observations controlling for country-year 
fixed effects. Estimation is by OLS. Columns 1-3 use DUse_TUse and Columns 4-6 use DownMeasure as the downstreamness variable respectively. In 
all columns, the industry factor intensity and dispersion variables are a weighted average of the characteristics of buyer industries (namely, the industries 
that buy the input in question). The main effects of the buyer industry elasticity quintile dummies are controlled for, but not reported. "Weighted" columns 
use the value of total imports for the industry-year or country-industry-year respectively as regression weights.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Weighted Weighted Weighted Weighted Weighted
DUse_TUse X 1(Elas < Median) -0.187** -0.177** -0.103 -0.180** -0.130* -0.171* -0.188** -0.119 -0.199** -0.185**
[0.074] [0.072] [0.071] [0.077] [0.079] [0.093] [0.093] [0.080] [0.091] [0.084]
DUse_TUse X 1(Elas > Median) 0.157** 0.198*** 0.236*** 0.159** 0.158** 0.472*** 0.504*** 0.451*** 0.391*** 0.374***
[0.077] [0.068] [0.065] [0.068] [0.074] [0.144] [0.111] [0.125] [0.103] [0.090]
Value-added / Value shipments 0.187 0.216* 0.054 0.107
[0.135] [0.125] [0.275] [0.167]
Input "Importance" -1.687 -1.453 -3.484*** -3.975***
[1.231] [1.302] [1.021] [0.802]
Intermediation -0.464*** -0.413*** -0.673*** -0.654***
[0.106] [0.102] [0.168] [0.149]
Own Contractibility 0.019 0.024 0.184** 0.198***
[0.048] [0.047] [0.076] [0.075]
Buyer contractibility -0.199*** -0.169** -0.499*** -0.508***
[0.067] [0.065] [0.108] [0.109]
Year fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2783 2783 2783 2783 2783 2783 2783 2783 2783 2783
R-squared 0.33 0.33 0.38 0.37 0.41 0.61 0.63 0.65 0.66 0.73
Dependent variable:   Intrafirm Import Share
Robustness Checks: DUse_TUse
Table 6
Notes: ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. Standard errors are clustered by industry. All columns use industry-year observations controlling for year fixed effects. 
Estimation is by OLS. The value-added / value shipments, intermediation, input "importance", and own contractibility variables are characteristics of the seller industry (namely, the industry that sells the 
input in question), while the buyer contractibility variable is a weighted average of the contractibility of buyer industries (the industries that buy the input in question). All columns include additional control 
variables whose coefficients are not reported, namely: (i) the level effect of the buyer industry elasticity dummy, and (ii) buyer industry factor intensity and dispersion variables. "Weighted" columns use the 
value of total imports for the industry-year as regression weights.
1(Elas > Median), Log (s/l), Log (equipment k / l), Log (plant k / l), Log (materials/l), Log (0.001+ R&D/Sales), Dispersion
Additional buyer industry controls included:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Weighted Weighted Weighted Weighted Weighted
DownMeasure X 1(Elas < Median) 0.014 0.021 0.083 0.007 0.046 -0.137 -0.152 -0.040 -0.213** -0.216**
[0.067] [0.065] [0.062] [0.067] [0.065] [0.110] [0.110] [0.101] [0.103] [0.099]
DownMeasure X 1(Elas > Median) 0.277*** 0.294*** 0.310*** 0.284*** 0.270*** 0.515*** 0.505*** 0.500*** 0.442*** 0.371***
[0.084] [0.081] [0.076] [0.075] [0.075] [0.098] [0.098] [0.097] [0.084] [0.066]
Value-added / Value shipments 0.168 0.235* 0.331 -0.599***
[0.130] [0.120] [0.208] [0.150]
Input "Importance" -0.954 -0.866 -1.565* -2.805***
[1.351] [1.403] [0.806] [0.633]
Intermediation -0.488*** -0.443*** -0.652*** -0.599***
[0.104] [0.103] [0.161] [0.150]
Own Contractibility 0.062 0.059 0.204*** 0.211***
[0.046] [0.044] [0.077] [0.064]
Buyer contractibility -0.238*** -0.197*** -0.509*** -0.514***
[0.065] [0.063] [0.110] [0.102]
Year fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2783 2783 2783 2783 2783 2783 2783 2783 2783 2783
R-squared 0.33 0.39 0.33 0.37 0.42 0.65 0.68 0.65 0.69 0.75
Table 7
Robustness Checks: DownMeasure
Dependent variable:   Intrafirm Import Share
Additional buyer industry controls included:
1(Elas > Median), Log (s/l), Log (equipment k / l), Log (plant k / l), Log (materials/l), Log (0.001+ R&D/Sales), Dispersion
Notes: ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. Standard errors are clustered by industry. All columns use industry-year observations controlling for year fixed effects. 
Estimation is by OLS. The value-added / value shipments, intermediation, input "importance", and own contractibility variables are characteristics of the seller industry (namely, the industry that sells the 
input in question), while the buyer contractibility variable is a weighted average of the contractibility of buyer industries (the industries that buy the input in question). All columns include additional control 
variables whose coefficients are not reported, namely: (i) the level effect of the buyer industry elasticity dummy, and (ii) buyer industry factor intensity and dispersion variables. "Weighted" columns use the 
value of total imports for the industry-year as regression weights.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Downstreamness: DUse_TUse DUse_TUse DUse_TUse DownMeasure DownMeasure DownMeasure
Weighted Weighted Weighted Weighted
Downstream X 1 (Elas < Med) X (HQ Quintile 1) 0.049 0.009 -0.016 0.351*** 0.301** 0.290**
[0.129] [0.139] [0.118] [0.128] [0.134] [0.129]
Downstream X 1 (Elas < Med) X (HQ Quintile 2) -0.268** -0.477*** -0.331** -0.161 -0.312* -0.169
[0.118] [0.162] [0.148] [0.103] [0.186] [0.150]
Downstream X 1 (Elas < Med) X (HQ Quintile 3) -0.175 -0.162 -0.158 0.072 -0.020 -0.058
[0.148] [0.138] [0.124] [0.131] [0.160] [0.145]
Downstream X 1 (Elas < Med) X (HQ Quintile 4) -0.377*** -0.658*** -0.455*** -0.121 -0.394** -0.280**
[0.134] [0.108] [0.069] [0.128] [0.172] [0.125]
Downstream X 1 (Elas < Med) X (HQ Quintile 5) 0.177 -0.046 0.024 0.229 -0.181 -0.050
[0.171] [0.192] [0.172] [0.157] [0.160] [0.158]
Downstream X 1 (Elas > Med) X (HQ Quintile 1) 0.196 0.805** 0.798*** 0.465*** 0.624*** 0.593***
[0.248] [0.325] [0.278] [0.163] [0.113] [0.087]
Downstream X 1 (Elas > Med) X (HQ Quintile 2) -0.037 -0.099 -0.180 0.032 -0.001 -0.061
[0.146] [0.181] [0.175] [0.130] [0.238] [0.189]
Downstream X 1 (Elas > Med) X (HQ Quintile 3) 0.216* 0.172 0.027 0.358*** 0.357 0.099
[0.119] [0.207] [0.145] [0.135] [0.257] [0.199]
Downstream X 1 (Elas > Med) X (HQ Quintile 4) 0.130 0.819** 0.427 0.280* 0.519 0.079
[0.161] [0.390] [0.341] [0.159] [0.427] [0.352]
Downstream X 1 (Elas > Med) X (HQ Quintile 5) 0.183** 0.271* 0.162 0.179 0.274 0.225*
[0.082] [0.144] [0.114] [0.117] [0.197] [0.117]
Main and double interaction effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects? Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Country-Year fixed effects? No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 2783 2783 207991 2783 2783 207991
R-squared 0.40 0.69 0.63 0.40 0.71 0.65
Extension: Effect of Headquarter Intensity
Table 8
Dependent variable:   Intrafirm Import Share
Notes: ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. Standard errors are clustered by industry. Columns 1-2 and 4-5 
use industry-year observations controlling for year fixed effects, while Columns 3 and 6 use country-industry-year observations controlling for country-
year fixed effects. Estimation is by OLS. Columns 1-3 use DUse_TUse and Columns 4-6 use DownMeasure as the downstreamness variable 
respectively. The hq intensity measure is the first principal component of the buyer industry's Log (s/l), Log (equipment k/l), and Log (0.001 + 
R&D/Sales). All columns include additional control variables whose coefficients are not reported, namely: (i) the main and double interaction effects of 
the buyer industry elasticity dummies and hq intensity quintile dummies, and (ii) buyer industry factor intensity and dispersion variables. "Weighted" 
columns use the value of total imports for the industry-year or country-industry-year respectively as regression weights.
Log (s/l), Log (equipment k/l), and Log (0.001+R&D/Sales)
HQ intensity:  First Principal Component of Buyer Industry
Additional buyer industry controls included:
Log (s/l), Log (equipment k / l), Log (plant k / l), Log (materials/l),
 Log (0.001+ R&D/Sales), Dispersion
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Downstreamness: DUse_TUse DUse_TUse DUse_TUse DownMeasure DownMeasure DownMeasure
Weighted Weighted Weighted Weighted
(Downstream Quin 1) X 1(Elas < Median) 0.101** 0.210*** 0.145*** 0.060 0.184*** 0.145**
[0.045] [0.058] [0.045] [0.051] [0.067] [0.059]
(Downstream Quin 2) X 1(Elas < Median) 0.041 0.131** 0.096* -0.005 0.062 0.019
[0.043] [0.062] [0.054] [0.045] [0.069] [0.055]
(Downstream Quin 3) X 1(Elas < Median) 0.008 0.063 0.010 -0.016 0.089 0.049
[0.046] [0.057] [0.046] [0.049] [0.076] [0.060]
(Downstream Quin 4) X 1(Elas < Median) -0.047 0.092 0.047 0.024 0.064 0.032
[0.043] [0.065] [0.051] [0.045] [0.075] [0.058]
(Downstream Quin 5) X 1(Elas < Median) 0.017 0.084 0.082 0.023 0.039 0.058
[0.042] [0.063] [0.053] [0.042] [0.081] [0.064]
(Downstream Quin 2) X 1(Elas > Median) 0.021 0.031 0.016 0.013 -0.054 -0.068
[0.036] [0.067] [0.056] [0.039] [0.069] [0.052]
(Downstream Quin 3) X 1(Elas > Median) 0.086** 0.150** 0.072 0.035 0.076 0.018
[0.044] [0.065] [0.052] [0.047] [0.069] [0.066]
(Downstream Quin 4) X 1(Elas > Median) 0.030 0.086 0.017 0.073* 0.056 0.013
[0.048] [0.056] [0.050] [0.043] [0.072] [0.060]
(Downstream Quin 5) X 1(Elas > Median) 0.181*** 0.352*** 0.257*** 0.171*** 0.380*** 0.300***
[0.048] [0.067] [0.062] [0.059] [0.085] [0.074]
Downstream Quin and Elasticity dummies? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects? Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Country-Year fixed effects? No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 2783 2783 207991 2783 2783 207991
R-squared 0.35 0.63 0.61 0.33 0.67 0.63
Table 9
Extension: Implications of Firm Heterogeneity
Dependent variable:   Intrafirm Import Share
Notes: ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. Standard errors are clustered by industry. Columns 1-2 and 4-
5 use industry-year observations controlling for year fixed effects, while Columns 3 and 6 use country-industry-year observations controlling for 
country-year fixed effects. Estimation is by OLS. Columns 1-3 use DUse_TUse and Columns 4-6 use DownMeasure as the downstreamness 
variable respectively. All columns include additional control variables whose coefficients are not reported, namely: (i) the main effects of the 
downstreamness quintile dummies and the buyer industry elasticity dummies, and (ii) buyer industry factor intensity and dispersion variables. 
"Weighted" columns use the value of total imports for the industry-year or country-industry-year respectively as regression weights.
Additional buyer industry controls included:
Log (s/l), Log (equipment k / l), Log (plant k / l), Log (materials/l),
 Log (0.001+ R&D/Sales), Dispersion
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Downstreamness: DUse_TUse DUse_TUse DUse_TUse DownMeasure DownMeasure DownMeasure
Probit Weighted Weighted Probit Weighted Weighted
Log (s/l) 0.424** -0.079 -0.072 0.343** -0.107** -0.104**
[0.166] [0.065] [0.059] [0.167] [0.048] [0.050]
   Log (equipment k / l) -0.084 0.131*** 0.130*** -0.056 0.125*** 0.124***
[0.203] [0.040] [0.041] [0.176] [0.040] [0.041]
   Log (plant k / l) -0.026 -0.139*** -0.140*** -0.030 -0.113** -0.113**
[0.234] [0.046] [0.046] [0.217] [0.049] [0.048]
Log (materials/l) -0.083 0.063 0.061 -0.098 0.042 0.040
[0.136] [0.043] [0.042] [0.133] [0.042] [0.041]
Buyer Log (0.001+ R&D/Sales) -0.015 0.080*** 0.080*** 0.001 0.080*** 0.080***
[0.064] [0.014] [0.014] [0.061] [0.014] [0.014]
Dispersion -0.234 0.117 0.113 -0.284 0.178 0.175
[0.405] [0.104] [0.104] [0.392] [0.115] [0.117]
Downstream X 1(Elas < Median) 0.047 -0.073 -0.072 0.634** -0.020 -0.011
[0.310] [0.074] [0.074] [0.317] [0.097] [0.088]
Downstream X 1(Elas > Median) 0.274 0.310*** 0.314*** -0.291 0.353*** 0.347***
[0.252] [0.106] [0.102] [0.246] [0.078] [0.084]
1(Elas > Median) 0.003 -0.268*** -0.268*** 0.661*** -0.244*** -0.234***
[0.231] [0.075] [0.075] [0.233] [0.076] [0.073]
Seller Log (0.001+ R&D/Sales) -0.028*** -0.028***
     X Country Entry Costs [0.007] [0.007]
Seller Log (0.001+ R&D/Sales) 0.030 0.026
[0.045] [0.041]
Inverse Mills Ratio -0.120 -0.082
[0.250] [0.197]
Industry controls for: Buyer Buyer Buyer Buyer Buyer Buyer
Country-year fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample: Total imports 
>=0
Total imports 
> 0
Total imports 
> 0
Total imports 
>=0
Total imports 
> 0
Total imports 
> 0
Observations 462990 186029 186029 462990 186029 186029
R-squared - 0.63 0.63 - 0.64 0.64
Table 10
Selection into Intrafirm Trade
Dependent variable:   Intrafirm Import Share
Notes: ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. Standard errors are clustered by industry. Columns 1 and 
4 report the first-stage probits. The exclusion restriction variable is the seller industry's R&D intensity, Log (0.001+ R&D/Sales), and its 
interaction with a dummy variable for countries with above sample-median entry costs. The latter is constructed from the first principal 
component of the number of procedures, number of days, and monetary cost of starting a business, from the Doing Business dataset. 
Columns 2 and 5 report the second stage, which is run using weighted least squares; the observation weights are the value of total imports for 
the country-industry-year in question. Columns 3 and 6 report the second-stage regression excluding the inverse Mills ratio, to provide a 
comparison. Columns 1-3 use DUse_TUse and Columns 4-6 use DownMeasure as the downstreamness variable respectively. All columns 
also control for the buyer industry factor intensity and dispersion variables, as well as country-year fixed effects.
